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ABSTRACT
The golden age of the Royal Navy, which saw its apotheosis at the Battle of
Trafalgar in 1805, also presented one of the great paradoxes of modern naval
organization. “Young gentlemen,” some as young as eight or nine, were placed in
positions of authority aboard His Majesty’s ships and expected to command veteran
mariners with decades of sea experience. The effectiveness of this system, and the
continued success of the Royal Navy as an institution, tended to belie the obvious
disadvantages of placing adolescent recruits on the quarterdecks of active men-of-war.
This study examines two aspects of the process that allowed midshipmen and
quarterdeck boys to function within the shipboard hierarchy and offers explanation by
way of J. C. D. Clark’s theory of a persistent ancien régime mentality in English society.
Part I examines the selection of boys destined for command. A trend that began in
the late 1770s saw a dramatic increase in the number of “Honorable” boys, those with
significant social and or political “interest”, entering the service. Many senior officers
lamented the preferential treatment granted these young notables and its deleterious effect
on subordination. Within the context of Clark’s theory of a “patrician hegemony,” the
desirability of a naval career during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars
meant that, increasingly, opportunities benefited the elite. The natural authority granted
by birth was also widely accepted by the men of the lower deck, despite social unrest
stirring in France and the effects of the Great Mutinies of 1797.
Part II looks at the sources of a young gentleman’s authority. Those institutions,
both naval and civilian, that granted young gentlemen their practical and theoretical
status as officers-in-training, also reinforced the structure of the old order.

v

The increasing social status of young gentlemen in the Royal Navy of the Great
Wars and the processes that maintained their authority reflected wider social and cultural
trends – developments that confirmed the view of Georgian England as an ancien régime.

vi

INTRODUCTION

In 1800 Midshipman Lord William Fitzroy, fourth son of the Duke of Grafton,
passed his examination for lieutenant and entered the ranks of the Royal Navy’s
commissioned officers. Though only eighteen, a full two years shy of the minimum age
required to become a lieutenant, Fitzroy’s political and social interest superceded
Admiralty regulations and propelled his career forward. Rapid promotion continued and
Fitzroy received his step to post captain in 1804.1 A series of uneventful commands did
not prevent Fitzroy’s appointment to the new, thirty-eight gun frigate HMS Macedonian
in 1810. As “plum” an appointment as the Royal Navy could offer at the time,
Macedonian represented the opportunity for independent cruising in the increasingly
hostile American shipping lanes. She also presented Fitzroy his best chance of making
prizes from the vastly reduced fleet of French merchantmen plying the Atlantic trade in
the wake of Trafalgar. Macedonian’s newly completed crew of more than three hundred
mariners and Royal Marines experienced a taste of Fitzroy’s temperament with the
enforcement of his first standing order that required the men address him as “my Lord”
rather than “Captain.” Fitzroy’s next order condemned a seaman to forty-eight lashes for
“the very sailor like offense of getting drunk,”2 a sentence four times the standard
punishment traditionally allowed a captain outside a court martial. By March 1811
Fitzroy stood before his own court martial facing charges brought by Macedonian’s
sailing master who accused him of falsifying expense reports on ship’s stores and

1

The National Archives of the UK (TNA): Public Records Office (PRO) Reference Books 359.3 ADB,
Steel’s Navy List, December, 1801.
2
Samuel Leech, Thirty Years from Home; or, a Voice from the Main Deck (London: H. G. Collins, 1851),
p. 27.
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profiting from the difference. The findings of the Admiralty court, however, focused on
Fitzroy’s brutality towards the men as much as the charges of fraud, citing “False
Expense of Stores – Tyranny and Oppression” as the basis for his dismissal from the
service.3 Five months later, Fitzroy reappeared in the navy list, fully reinstated without
loss of seniority. Political and social weight had, once again, intervened in Fitzroy’s
favor, proving that connections could trump Admiralty law, even when that law
supported the best interests of the service. Despite Fitzroy’s public flouting of naval
authority, he continued to profit from the Royal Navy’s rigid system of promotion.
Beyond the rank of post captain, seniority alone controlled advancement and elevation to
flag rank. Although discreetly denied active command after 1811, Fitzroy progressed
inevitably up the naval ladder, becoming an admiral and drawing an admiral’s pay until
his death in 1857.
Fitzroy’s story reflects two important trends evident in the Royal Navy during the
French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. First, it exemplifies the increasing weight
ascribed to aristocratic and political connections in both the selection of young officers
for sea service and the pace of their promotion. Second, it reveals a growing concern on
the part of the Admiralty for the treatment of seamen whose protests commanded greater
attention in the wake of the 1797 mutinies.
In the years after the Peace of Amiens, high-ranking contemporaries including
First Lord of the Admiralty, the Earl St. Vincent and Commander-in-Chief of the
Mediterranean Fleet, Viscount Horatio Nelson, voiced their concerns for the influx of
aristocratic and politically-favored boys into the service. Their concerns addressed the
issue of social precedence and its corrosive effects on naval professionalism. They
3

TNA: PRO ADM12/27D, “Black Book,” Vol. III, 1807-1815.
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understood too, that the root of the problem lay with the entry-level quarterdeck ranks –
with those boys who entered the service, typically between the ages of nine and nineteen,
with the express aim of becoming sea officers. Known officially as “young gentlemen,”
this title encompassed a variety of epithets that fell in and out of favor during the course
of the Great Wars. Midshipman, Captain’s Servant, Volunteer First Class, Boy First
Class, were all used to indicate boys being groomed for command. While N. A. M.
Rodger argues that “the eighteenth century Admiralty had almost no control over the
recruitment of its officers,”4 something changed during the course of the French
Revolutionary Wars such that the 1803 mobilization saw nearly four times as many
“Honorable” midshipmen, that is the sons of baronets or higher, pass the examination for
lieutenant than during the 1793 mobilization.5 While a “strong middle-class element”6
continued to flourish in the navy’s corps of junior officers, the sons of noblemen and
high-ranking gentlemen represented a rapidly growing minority during the Great Wars.
Synchronous to this trend were broadening concerns for the treatment of seamen.
The fleet-wide mutinies of 1797 highlighted the potential for anarchy, if not in the minds
of mariners then in the consciousness of officers whose numbers represented a tiny
portion of the complement of any man-of-war. The precariousness of the social structure
that sustained the power of the quarterdeck had become all too clear. Officers who
brutalized seamen without justification felt the wrath of an Admiralty keen to avoid
further uprisings from the lower deck. For midshipmen and quarterdeck boys, the

4

N. A. M. Rodger, “Officers, Gentlemen and their Education, 1793-1860,” in Les Empires en
Guerre et Paix, Journées Franco-Anglais d’Histoire de la Marine, Portsmouth, 23-36 Mars,
1988, ed. Edward Freeman (Vincennes, France: Service Historique de la Marine, 1990), p. 139.
5
TNA: PRO Ref. Bks. 359.3 ADB, Steel’s Navy List, 1794-1815. See Appendix A.
6
Michael Lewis, A Social History of the Navy, 1793-1815 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1960), p. xii.
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curtailing of disrespectful or unnecessarily authoritarian behavior took different forms, all
of which tended to limit their authority.
The apparently conflicting social dynamics that produced a more aristocratic and
gentlemanly midshipman’s berth and at the same time hobbled its authoritative status
provide the two thematic approaches for this study. The factors that produced these shifts,
whether internal or external to the Royal Navy, offer a key to understanding
developments in the attitudes of both the Admiralty and the men of George III’s navy.
The general trends apparent within the service also present a microcosmic view of wider
patterns in English society at large during the Great Wars.
Two Critical Events for the Georgian Navy
A direct correlation can be drawn between the rising social status of a naval career
and the level of political and social interference in the appointment of young gentlemen.
The decision to take a boy to sea as an officer-in-training traditionally resided with
individual captains; however, the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries saw a
variety of pressures intrude upon that prerogative. During Pepysian days when a naval
career ranked among the lowliest, least-desirable of professions, the Royal Navy and her
commanders enjoyed a substantial measure of operational independence, distanced as
they were from the kinds of political and social influences so prevalent in army
recruitment and promotion. As Pepys noted in his Naval Minutes, “have any of our
Heralds allowed in express words the seaman for a gentleman?”7
During the last quarter of the seventeenth century, royal attempts to correct this
situation led to a greater separation between “gentlemen” and “tarpaulin officers,” those

7

Samuel Pepys, Naval Minutes, quoted in Geoffrey Holmes, Augustan England: Professions, State and
Society, 1680-1730 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), p. 275.
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of humble origin raised from the lower deck as thorough-going professionals. The
emergence of King’s Letter Boys or volunteers per order, genteel young recruits seeking
a naval career, represented the political push to create a new corps of well-bred and
professional officers. But the effort begun during the reign of Charles II had gained only
a little momentum by that of George I and a “pronounced ‘social mix’ in the
commissioned ranks of the Royal Navy” remained a prominent feature of naval life.8 The
process of stereotyping young officers according to their lowest common social
denominator continued well into the last quarter of the eighteenth century, bolstered by
the fact that in the “unnatural world” of the Royal Navy, “the order of civil society was
subverted.”9 Distinctions of dress, accommodation, diet, and most importantly, the
deference afforded by noble birth, blurred in the dank confines of the midshipman’s berth
and upon that great social leveler, the quarterdeck. Aboard a man-of-war, naval rank
superceded social rank. Between the American and French Revolutionary Wars,
however, the equation began to change.
The first important event to affect general opinions of a naval career occurred in
1779 when George III sent his third son, Prince William Henry, to sea as a midshipman
with the instructions, “the young man goes as a sailor, and as such, I add again, no marks
of distinction are to be shown unto him; they would destroy my whole plan.”10 Exactly
what this plan might have been is open to speculation. As the first Hanoverian to
proclaim himself an Englishman first and foremost, George’s commitment of a son to the
sea service tendered proof of his patriotic zeal. It also reflected a belief in the need for

8

Holmes, Augustan, p. 276.
N. A. M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815 (New York: W. W.
Norton, 2004), p. 392.
10
King George III to Sir S. Hood, June 11, 1779, quoted in Rodger, Command, p. 388.
9
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princes to acquire first-hand knowledge of naval and military institutions, as prerequisites
for informed and empathic leadership. The decision was, however, a “socially radical,
even revolutionary”11 step which instantly improved public perceptions of the Royal
Navy and elevated its officers to an unprecedented level of social acceptability. In the
following decades, the rising social status of officers in the Royal Navy encouraged the
sons (not always the younger) of aristocratic families (not always impoverished) to seek
positions as young gentlemen aboard men-of-war. Yearly editions of Steel’s Navy List
from the French Revolutionary Wars show an increasing number of “Honorable”
midshipmen becoming lieutenants, indicating the growing popularity of a naval career.
For the French Revolutionary Wars, this trend peaked in 1797,12 the year of the illustrious
Battle of Cape St. Vincent for which Sir John Jervis earned his eponymous earldom and
Nelson rose to international fame.
1797 also marked the second great watershed for social dynamics within the
Royal Navy. A series of mutinies beginning with the Channel Fleet at Spithead, followed
by ships stationed at the Nore, then by the North Sea Squadron at Yarmouth, sent
shockwaves through naval command, rudely reminding both the Admiralty and
Parliament that order depended entirely on the consent of the seamen who worked their
ships.
These two events affected both internal and external perceptions of the Royal
Navy and forced senior officers to reevaluate their methods and their men in order to
preserve discipline as much as the functionality of the service. Disdain for young,
aristocratic incompetents like Lord William Fitzroy mounted, prompting St. Vincent to

11
12

Rodger, Command, p. 388.
See Appendix A, “Honorable Lieutenants Passed by Year, per Steel’s Navy List.”
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remark in 1806 that “this vast overflow of young nobility in the Service makes rapid
strides to the decay of Seamanship, as well as Subordination. . . .”13 St. Vincent’s
concerns for the professionalism of officers and the maintenance of discipline and order
aboard ship summarized two of the crucial issues involving midshipmen and quarterdeck
boys during the Great Wars.
Part I of this study addresses the selection of officers-in-training between 1793
and 1815 and indicates the extent to which wider social, political, and cultural trends
infiltrated the Royal Navy and encroached upon the independence of captains in their
selection of young gentlemen destined for command. The result of such intervention was
a mounting tension between sea officers who originated from the “middling ranks”14 of
society and a corps of aristocratic young gentlemen whose influence confused the line
between social and naval subordination.
Part II addresses the concern voiced by Lord St. Vincent and other senior officials
for the professionalism of future naval officers. Over the course of the Great Wars the
nature of the authority wielded by young gentlemen changed in order to remedy abuses
and as a response to the new social dynamic between lower deck and quarterdeck. The
cultural and institutional constructs that enabled inexperienced boys to command veteran
able seamen altered subtly as a result of the 1797 mutinies. Internal sources of authority
generated by a ship’s captain, and ultimately by Admiralty law, were also tempered by
external influences such as revolutionary political and social instability, education, and

13

The Earl St. Vincent to Benjamin Tucker, Esq., HMS Hibernia off Ushant, March 17, 1806, in Jedediah
S. Tucker, ed. Memoirs of the Right Honourable the Earl St. Vincent G.C.B. etc., Vol. II (London:
Richard Bentley, 1844), p. 270.
14
Contemporaries preferred “middling sort” or “middling rank” to the term “middle class”, which came
into use in the 1790s. Its members did not like to think of themselves belonging to a rigid social strata
implied by the word “class.” See Langford, Polite, p. 61.

7

religion. Both sets of influences produced occasionally conflicting results, at times
limiting and at times reinforcing the authority of midshipmen and quarterdeck boys.
While signs of a changing social equation within Britain in the last decade of the
eighteenth century appeared in the altered character of a petty officer’s authority, an
increasingly aristocratic midshipman’s berth and a narrowing field of selection for entrylevel officers reflected wider social and political currents that, in fact, supported the
maintenance of an ancien régime in British society. The conflict inherent in the position
of the quarterdeck boy embodied the dueling forces within the Royal Navy and within
society at large – between old-order traditions and social mobility. The ability of the
service to absorb the effects of both and to emerge as a strong, professional institution
that flourished late into the nineteenth century provides evidence of the flexibility and
resilience of the Royal Navy as a sub-culture of Georgian society.
Testing Social Theories Using the Royal Navy Model
Characterizations of English society as either a “dynamic state” or an “old order”
draw principally on the works of two scholars with opposing views on the nature of
eighteenth-century society. Paul Langford challenges all notions of stability, classifying
the long eighteenth century as a period of massive and universal change. Expanding on
the contemporary view that agricultural and industrial developments “wrought a
fundamental alteration in the English people,”15 Langford focuses on the growing middle
classes and their pursuit of “polite” status in all its forms including wealth, social rank,
and political power as the catalyst for social evolution. The idea that “the debasement of

15

John Andrews, quoted in Paul Langford, A Polite and Commercial People, England 1727-1783 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 679.
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gentility is one of the clearest signs of social change,”16 became manifest in the
operational standards of the Royal Navy of the early-eighteenth century. Here was an
institution that effectively opened professional opportunities to boys of the lower to
middling orders. From the 1730s until the last quarter of the eighteenth century, Royal
Navy command represented a largely unchallenged meritocracy and one of the best
enablers of social mobility. The impartial handling of midshipmen who originated from a
broad spectrum of social ranks reflected the navy’s disregard for traditional social
hierarchies in its command structure. It also reflected the Admiralty’s recognition of the
need to build an officer corps based on ability and skill. According to Langford, by the
close of the eighteenth century, the broadening middle classes, which included even
modest artisans and producers of commercial goods, represented an “increased threat to
traditional notions of a hierarchical society.”17 Young naval officers elevated from
humble backgrounds only contributed to that threat.
A culture of freedom and mobility, influenced by the liberalism of Romantic
radicals, found support from opposition Whigs and Dissenting ministers who touted the
constitutional “rights of Englishmen,” applicable to all regardless of social rank. The
Royal Navy’s appreciation of democratic principles sharpened in the wake of fleet-wide
mutiny, an event that sparked a new social conscience among officers whose
vulnerability had become all too obvious. In the first decade of the new century Captain
Alexander Ball noted that “no body of men can for any length of time be safely treated
otherwise than as rational beings. . . .” Midshipmen who attacked these “newly

16

17

Langford, Polite, p. 66.
Paul Langford, ed., The Eighteenth Century, 1688-1815 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 14.

9

rational”18 mariners, either physically or verbally without sufficient justification, found
themselves whipped, mastheaded, disrated, or dismissed from the service.
The relationship between lower deck and quarterdeck altered as the new balance
of power within the Royal Navy forced officers to confront the old precept of rule by
consent. More humane approaches to the management of crews and the fostering of
patriotic fervor amongst the lower deck echoed elements of a dynamic social equation
and the transmutation of democratic revolutionary ideology into a far safer form – that of
enlightened nationalism. In these developments the Royal Navy example supports
Langford’s theory of sweeping social change. But while change undoubtedly occurred
over the course of the long eighteenth century, its manifestations both within the
Admiralty and aboard its men-of-war diverge from Langford’s unidirectional model of
social progress.
In contrast to Langford, J. C. D. Clark champions the notion of England as an
ancien régime. Clark argued that throughout the Great Wars, England remained a “preindustrial,” “aristocratic,” “confessional state,” in which the twin foundations of society –
law and religion – maintained a state of “patrician hegemony” over a broad social
spectrum. While this diversity spurred conflict, from socio-economic discord to religious
upheavals, Clark argues that the ability of English society to absorb these shocks, to settle
on middle ground, and to assimilate rather than revolt grew from a fundamental social
consensus: that the dominance of the patrician elite was justified by laws both natural and
revealed.19 Clark acknowledges that by the close of the eighteenth century, “some degree
of mobility into (and out of) the patrician elite was possible in England,” an observation
18
19

Captain Alexander Ball and Captain Anselm Griffiths, quoted in Rodger, Command, p. 491.
J. C. D. Clark, English Society 1660-1832: Religion, Ideology and Politics During the Ancien Régime,
Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 15, 17, 25, 35-36.
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that broadens his definition of “aristocracy” to include members of the gentry who
possessed significant political and financial clout.20 Clark’s argument, that
“contemporary perceptions of the power and influence of the nobility and gentry were
legion,” builds upon the social theories of David Hume who understood that true
authority could not be “imposed by deception or force” but depended “on the willingness
of the many to obey the few because they saw in the few a certain embodiment of their
aspirations.”21
In naval terms, Clark’s model is supported by traditional notions of a rigid
shipboard hierarchy, whereby every man minded his place, and honored the system of
ranks and privileges out of a combination of duty and resignation, hope and tradition.
During the Great Wars, the increasing number of midshipman’s appointments granted on
the basis of noble birth and/or political influence also supported the notion of an
ascendant elite. In the last decades of the eighteenth century selection favoring those with
social rank, parliamentary favor, or at the very least, connections to a high-ranking naval
officer, superceded the navy’s position as an open meritocracy and thus reflected a
renewed state of patrician hegemony in naval command. N. A. M. Rodger relates this
trend to a reaction against the revolutionary ideas circulating in the wake of regicide in
France: “just as the French navy abandoned its tradition of choosing officers from the
nobility in favour of the career open to talent, the British Navy started moving in the
opposite direction.”22
The widening gap between quarterdeck and lower deck which, by 1815, looked
more like a chasm, supports Clark’s theory of a dominant patrician element. While the
20

Ibid., p. 24.
Ibid., pp. 35, 24.
22
Rodger, Command, p. 508.
21
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particulars of shipboard society evolved during the late 1790s, the general hierarchy
remained, becoming more firmly rooted in traditional social systems with each new
generation of notable Royal Navy recruits. It is undeniable that, by the turn of the
nineteenth century, the relationship between officers and men depended more heavily on
expectations of professionalism and mutually respectful conduct; however, the old codes
of paternalism and deference within shipboard society remained firm. With the new
century, the Royal Navy came to mirror the social make-up of a greater patrician society,
one in which birth, political connections, and/or wealth determined opportunities for
advancement.
Complications arose, however, with the influx of young officers whose
appointments and promotions came primarily as the result of “interest”. A process of
advancement that subordinated skill, motivation, or instinct for command to
qualifications of birth and connection threatened the implicit contract of professionalism
between officers and seamen. Unworthy junior officers were hardly revered by mariners
and subsequently struggled to maintain real authority. From the quarterdeck perspective,
reassertion of the old social order wrought havoc on the chain of command. By the start
of the Napoleonic Wars, the pressure on captains to take up aristocratic boys who were
not cut out for naval life increased. Admiral Cuthbert Collingwood complained of one
noble youth aboard his flagship: “. . . he is of no more use here as an officer than Bounce
is, and not near so entertaining.”23 Bounce was Collingwood’s dog. While it did not
necessarily follow that all aristocratic boys lacked talent, or a real desire to serve at sea,

23

Admiral Cuthbert Collingwood to Lady Collingwood, HMS Ocean off Cadiz, July 28, 1808, in G. L.
Newnham Collingwood, A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord
Collingwood: Interspersed with Memoirs of his Life, Second Edition, Vol. II (London: James Ridgway,
1828), pp. 198-99.
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the problems raised by the presence of socially-superior boys aboard Georgian men-ofwar posed a serious threat to the effectiveness of naval subordination. Officers of less
exalted status than Collingwood often moderated disciplinary measures against the sons
of notables, aware that in the prevailing political climate, their actions might receive
career-damaging censure. As shown in Part II of this study, lieutenants directly in charge
of quarterdeck boys became particularly conscious of whose interest their juniors
represented, as promotion to commander and post captain relied, to a large extent, on the
political favor of the Admiralty. In this way, the gentrification of the midshipman’s berth
threatened the professionalism of the quarterdeck and justified concerns for the future of
naval seamanship.
The Royal Navy’s ability to avoid destruction from competing internal and
external forces – from political influences on appointments, to social tensions affecting
shipboard hierarchies and the distribution of authority – is best explained using Clark’s
concept of assimilation, whereby social tensions were absorbed into a system based on
patrician hegemony. Roy Porter supports Clark’s notions of “elasticity” and “resilience”
in English social hierarchies as they reinforced the old order. Such qualities emphasized
the fact that while English society was “inegalitarian and oozing privilege . . . it was
neither brittle nor rigid.” 24 It is a description that accurately characterizes the naval
command structure.
The precedence given to boys with aristocratic and political influence, at the
expense of open entry and rewards based principally on merit, did not substantially
impede the Admiralty’s ability to maintain operational effectiveness throughout the Great
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Wars. The manoeuvring of aristocratic young gentlemen, often through promotion into
less crucial roles, as in the case of Lord William Fitzroy, provided a respectable yet
effective outlet for young men unsuited to sea command. For those who remained afloat,
the paternalistic duty that demanded expertise and infallibility from superiors echoed the
expanding reputation of the service. The decisive and popular victory at Trafalgar in 1805
pressured junior officers to shape up, spurred by the threat of public ignominy and
professional humiliation if their conduct failed to meet expectations.
While elements of Langford’s theory of social dynamics appear relevant to the
1797 mutinies and the more humane handling of seamen that resulted, interpretations of
old-order utilitarian motivations are equally apparent on either side of the 1797 uprisings.
The failure of the Admiralty to fulfill its basic duty of sustaining the health and welfare of
its seamen collided with the need to keep mariners contented if the Royal Navy’s fleets
were to remain functional. Mutual need uncovered middle ground and the opportunity for
conciliation within the existing social and institutional structure. Mariners’ appreciation
for strong and effective command did not dwindle with the institution of more restrained
approaches to authority and the use of discipline. The professional pride of lower-deck
men tended, in fact, to favor the type of authoritative command that conducted a “tight
ship.”25 Such attitudes only reinforced the old shipboard hierarchies. Demands for a
higher level of professionalism from the quarterdeck encouraged even greater separation
between officers and their men, providing further evidence of Clark’s social ancien
régime.
Langford’s vision of an increasingly open English society driven by merit might
appear more relevant to the reduction of the navy at the close of the Napoleonic Wars.
25
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The process of paying off hundreds of ships and beaching thousands of young officers
allowed the Admiralty to keep only the cream of career officers and those who thrived on
the new dynamics of shipboard life. Yet, the lasting effects of officer gentrification on the
navy of the mid to late-nineteenth century favor Clark’s explanation of a continuing
patrician hegemony. Rodger acknowledges the social polarization of lower deck
“commoners” and quarterdeck “gentlemen”, a phenomenon that became glaringly
apparent by 1815.26 Aristocratic and political demand saw a greater number of positions
for boys diverted to the sons of the elite, producing, by the end of the Napoleonic Wars, a
more socially homogeneous officer corps than had existed at the close of the Seven
Years’ War.27
Rodger emphasizes a vision of the Royal Navy as a microcosm of English society,
reflecting wider trends and developments that took place in the long eighteenth century:
“. . . for all its undoubted peculiarities, the Navy resembled the society from which it was
recruited in many more ways than it differed from it.”28 While Paul Langford’s dynamic
state describes the naval example up until the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the
evolutions of the 1790s through the 1810s reveal limitations in the application of his
theory. As the quarterdeck increasingly became the realm of the gentleman, Clark’s
notion of a patrician ascendancy more accurately represents the developments taking
place in George III’s Navy. Resilience and flexibility within a traditional social hierarchy
characterized the naval institution of the nineteenth century, allowing it to survive the
strains of complex social and political times.
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Clark notes evolutions within the “hegemonic set of ideas which provided the
ideological framework within which the changes happened.” It was an ancien régime that
embraced fluctuations in the social order (eschewing notions of stasis) to produce a state
that represented “hegemony rather than consensus.” The social changes that took place in
the Royal Navy of the Great Wars support the conclusion that “‘modernity’ did not mean
the end of ‘Old England’.”29 The application of Clark’s theory to the changing processes
of selection and to evolutions in the authority of midshipmen and quarterdeck boys
provides the framework for this study.
Identifying the Quarterdeck Boy
Michael Lewis’ definition of “quarterdeck” boy as opposed to “lower deck” boy
is useful in broadly identifying the difference between young men who possessed a good
chance of attaining commissioned status and those whose highest aspiration might be that
of able seaman or, at best, warrant officer (gunner, carpenter, boatswain, coxswain,
steward, or sailing master). It also eliminates problems created by the changing
conventions and rating systems that spanned the period under consideration. Before 1794
the most popular form of entry for quarterdeck boys was as “captain’s servant.” Despite
the implications, there was nothing menial about the position. Captain’s servants were
quarterdeck protégés, officers in the making, for whom the assignment of servile duties
would have represented a serious insult and demotion. Captains were encouraged to take
on as many “servants” as possible by dint of the fact that they received the pay, eighteen
shillings per lunar month,30 of each boy under their care. Muster rolls for three of the
largest ships present at the Battle of Quiberon Bay on November 20, 1759 show high
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ratios of captain’s servants to the total complement of Royal Navy men. (Excludes Royal
Marines).
Table 1: Ratios of Quarterdeck Boys to Total Complements, 1759.
Ship

Captain/Admiral

Complement
(R.N. only)
651

Captain’s Servants
32

Ratio Capt’s.
Servants to Crew
1:20

Namur

Buckle

Royal George

Campbell/Hawke

780

18

1:43

Union

Hardy/Evans

659

30

1:22

Sources: TNA: PRO ADM36/6255, 5747, 6948, Muster Books for Nov/Dec 1759, HMS Namur, HMS
Royal George, and HMS Union respectively.

In 1794 an Order in Council introduced the new rating of “Boy First Class” or
“First Class Volunteer,” theoretically abolishing all other entry-level ratings in an effort
to limit the number of boys bound for the quarterdeck to the regulation four-per-hundred
of the total crew.31 As compensation, captain’s wages increased, although it was likely
that the disparity saw many captains suffer financially. A comparative table showing the
number of first class volunteers and boys as a function of ships’ complements from three
of the largest ships at the Battle of Trafalgar, October 21, 1805 demonstrates a significant
change. (See Table 2)
It should be noted, however, that ways around the system were available and
popular. One method of circumventing regulations involved rating quarterdeck boys as
able seamen, thereby disguising their presence as far as the ship’s official muster was
concerned.
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Table 2: Ratios of Quarterdeck Boys to Total Complements, 1805.
Ship

Captain/Admiral

Complement
(R.N. only)
663

1st Class Boys &
Volunteers
9

Ratio 1st Class
Boys to Crew
1:73

Victory

Hardy/Nelson

Royal Sovereign

Rotherham/Collingwood

850*

7

1:121

Temeraire

Harvey

718

8

1:89

Sources: Robert Holden Mackenzie, The Trafalgar Roll, The Ships and the Officers, intro. by Colin White
(London: Chatham Publishing, 2004), pp. 2, 25, 47; and Dudley Pope, Decision at Trafalgar (New York:
Henry Holt & Co., 1999), pp. 189, 205.
(*) Note: This figure reflected Royal Sovereign’s intended complement, although it is known that she went
into battle at Trafalgar undermanned and unable to fight her guns on both sides at once.

Lieutenants’ passing certificates from 1805 show that 20 percent of those young
gentlemen who passed that year entered the service rated “able”.32 By this time the
practice of raising midshipmen and potential officers from the lower deck had faded.
“[T]he forty-year-old midshipman was becoming a rarity,” as potential officers were
increasingly singled out in childhood.33 Although no direct financial gains came from
rating additional young gentlemen as able seamen, it provided captains with a means of
granting politically advantageous favors (and thus boosting their own careers) at a time
when appointments for quarterdeck boys were at a premium.
Rodger suggests that the new volunteer ratings were tools of gentrification,
arguing that the difference between the three classes of boy – first, second, and third –
were based not on professional knowledge but on birth. According to the Order in
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Council of 1794, Boys of the First Class were “to consist of Young Gentlemen intended
for the Sea Service . . . : to be styled Volunteers and allowed wages at the rate of ₤6 per
annum.” The Second Class was “to consist of Boys between 15 and 17 years of age to be
divided into watches with the seamen in order to make them such – at ₤5 per annum.”
The Third Class consisted of “Boys between 13 and 15 years of age of whom Lieutenants
and other officers who are now allowed servants might be permitted to recommend to the
Captains, each of them one, to be the attendants upon such officers – at ₤4 per annum.”34
As Rodger notes, “since no attempt was made to test whatever qualities [a boy] might
possess, the only basis for the distinction . . . was that implied by the wording of the
Order in Council; that is between gentlemen and the rest.”35 The Order in Council of
1794 was therefore a major indicator in the official trend towards sanctifying the
quarterdeck as the exclusive realm of the gentleman. Controlling the number of official
positions for officers-in-training and limiting the social groups capable of filling those
positions, demonstrated the expanding influence of the Admiralty as a political body in
matters traditionally held as a captain’s prerogative.
For much of the eighteenth century, the selection of boys for sea service depended
on a combination of influence with and connections to individual captains, enthusiasm,
and luck. A relatively democratic process of selection made opportunities available to the
sons of sea officers, professional men, and the middling sort as much as to the sons of
peers. During the Great Wars, however, opportunities narrowed significantly. Political
and social pressure demanded that noble and notable boys receive priority placement.
The prevalence of “book entry,” the practice of entering a boy’s name in the muster years
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in advance of his actual appearance on board, spoke to the weight of outside influence on
a captain. “False muster” constituted a criminal offence, yet captains were very often
willing to risk their careers and their reputations for the opportunity to wield patronage or
advantage the son of a friend or relative. The five year-old Lord Thomas Cochrane, who
would later become the 10th Earl of Dundonald, found his way onto the books of
successive ships captained by his uncle Sir Alexander Cochrane. Lord Cochrane did not
take up his first appointment as midshipman until the age of seventeen,36 by which time
his seniority in the service was well established and most of his sea time required for the
examination for lieutenant completed. As long a captain did not attempt to draw pay for
the absentee “able seaman” or “master’s mate” the Admiralty tended to turn a blind eye.
Book entry, among other abuses, was not merely the province of gentleman
captains serving their own family interests. For captains of more humble origin it
represented an opportunity to exercise patronage – a decision that could benefit the son of
a fellow mariner as readily as the son of a parliamentarian. Yet, as the Great Wars
progressed, the political, social, and financial stakes associated with accepting the sons of
the elite as quarterdeck volunteers soared. The prospect of personal and professional gain
combined with Admiralty pressure to select boys backed by powerful interest narrowed
the field of candidates. All captains, genteel and otherwise, felt a mounting pressure from
above to accommodate the sons of notables, a factor that ensured the continuation of
book entry well into the first decade of the nineteenth century.37
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The Midshipman’s Lot
The life of a midshipman or quarterdeck boy aboard a Georgian man-of-war
varied from ship to ship and captain to captain. Disparities in the age and competency of
individual boys produced a wide range of experiences. On the one hand, there was
Midshipman Hamilton Davies, who found himself in command of a fire-brig at age ten.38
On the other hand, ten year-old William Henry Dillon was overwhelmed by the noise and
activity aboard his first ship, HMS Saturn. His fears resulted in a surly and “pensive
mood” that required the cheerful efforts and “soothing expressions” of his father.39 Most
cases, however, fell somewhere between these extremes. Midshipmen and quarterdeck
boys of all ages generally came under the immediate supervision of a ship’s lieutenants
who served as both professional and personal mentors. Lieutenants regulated the
separation of their own divisions into sub-divisions, placing a young gentleman in charge
of each as a means of acquainting him with the duties of command. Standard
responsibilities included such tasks as running aloft to supervise seamen in setting,
reefing, or furling sail; supervising sub-divisions at small arms training; attending to the
swift transition of the watch; maintaining the ship’s safety by constantly checking for
naked lights and lanterns below decks; witnessing visits to the purser’s, steward’s or
boatswain’s store rooms; and casting the log line in order to determine the speed and,
when in soundings, the position of the ship. Beyond these basics, practical duties varied
greatly, often depending on the type of ship in which a young gentleman served. Rodger
notes the disparities from ship to ship:
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It was commonly remarked that there were different types of midshipmen in
different ships: sophisticated and hard-swearing in ships of the line, slovenly and
ill-bred in little sloops and brigs, but an elite in the frigates, smart and proud of
facing early danger and responsibility.40
Much of this stereotyping stemmed from the nature of the commissions awarded
the various ships. As reconnaissance vessels, frigates generally received independent
cruises, detached from a fleet and were usually exempt from banal convoy duties.
Intelligent, highly-motivated captains received these “plum” commands and typically
wasted no time in seeking out engagement and potential prizes. Boys of similar mettle
aspired to frigate service. By seventeen John Harvey Boteler, who later became a
distinguished captain, expressed such a desire: “. . . my brother Thomas and I, having
served so far in ships of the line, both wished for a more active time in frigates. . . .”41 A
boy’s participation in boarding actions, cutting-out expeditions, and shore raids, all of
which required hand-to-hand combat with pistols and dirks, were virtually assured in
frigate service.42 The popularity and prestige of serving aboard a “crack” frigate meant
that the sons of noblemen and prominent gentlemen often found their way into these
scarce and coveted positions. The four frigates present during the Trafalgar action
shipped one quarter of the aristocratic young gentlemen out of a fleet of thirty-three
vessels.43 Yet for all the opportunities frigates presented for distinguished service and
prize money, their quarterdeck boys sacrificed on comfort. Peter Cullen, a gentleman
who served as surgeon’s mate aboard the frigate Squirrel, described the berth for himself,
eight midshipmen, and two master’s mates which consisted of two small spaces forward
40
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of the officers’ quarters on the lower deck, where they slung their hammocks and ate their
meals adjacent the bulk of the ship’s company.44 Genteel boys from comfortable middle
and upper-class environments often expressed horror at the conditions aboard a man-ofwar. Young Frederick Chamier wrote of his coming aboard the frigate Salsette in 1809:
I had anticipated a kind of elegant house with guns in the windows . . . [but found]
the tars of England rolling about casks, without jackets, shoes or stockings . . . the
deck was dirty, slippery, and wet; the smells abominable; the whole sight
disgusting . . . I remarked the slovenly attire of the midshipmen, dressed in shabby
round jackets, glazed hats, no gloves, and some without shoes. . . . 45
Conditions were hardly better in larger ships. First through third rates (vessels of
over one hundred guns down to vessels of sixty-four guns) allowed young gentlemen
separate quarters. Midshipmen and quarterdeck boys aged fourteen and older berthed on
the orlop, the lowest deck above the hold in a dank space forward of the mizzen mast
dubbed the “cockpit”. At approximately five hundred to eleven hundred square feet, a
ship of the line’s cockpit accommodated anywhere from twenty to thirty-plus
midshipmen, master’s mates, surgeon’s mates and other petty officers,46 providing a
place for them to eat, sleep, and pass their free time. Situated well below the water line,
the cockpit’s only light came from tallow dips, whose stench mingled with the miasma of
putrid bilge water, rotting timber, and the ooze from casks of rancid food. One
midshipman, remarking on the dearth of air in the cockpit, noted that it was impossible to
keep a flame alight. Proximity to the hold did not help matters. Long cruises often saw
the build up of toxic gases in the hold which, despite their ability to asphyxiate human
beings, failed to eradicate the vermin that infested the lower reaches of a ship. Robert
44
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Mercer Wilson, a young captain’s clerk described the results of cleaning and “smoking”
the hold of the frigate Unite in 1808: “Opened the hatches, found about one thousand
mice dead.”47
Edward Thompson Esq., a civilian commentator, lamented the conditions faced
by young gentlemen who were “bedded worse than hogs, and eat less delicacies. . . .”48
Midshipmen and boys, regardless of social rank, generally ate the same fare as seamen
and warrant officers. Salt beef and pork, ships’ biscuit, cheese, pease porridge, portable
soup, and the occasional fresh vegetable, all washed down with a gallon of small beer or
a pint of grog each day made it a harsh transition for the palates of well-bred boys
accustomed to fine food and wine. Invitations to dine at the captain’s table or in the ward
room with the senior officers often brought the only respite from a menu that was at best
tasteless and at worst putrid.
“Youngsters,” or boys under thirteen, berthed with the gunner in the Gun Room.
Not quite as “stygian” and a somewhat healthier place for an “officers’ nursery,” the Gun
Room also provided adult supervision under a “steady sort of man” like the master
gunner.49 Warrant officers were also known to bring their wives to sea despite Admiralty
regulations, yet their function as surrogate mothers to the youngest quarterdeck recruits
often contributed to the toleration these particular women aboard ship. Even boys lucky
enough to find maternal care aboard a man-of-war endured a life of shocking rawness.
Working uniforms consisted of coarse wool or kersey round-jackets and duck or canvas
trousers. The “short clothes” of the navy offered little distinction between quarterdeck
47
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boys and their inferiors. Dress uniforms introduced prior to the Seven Years’ War
allowed young gentlemen some outward signs of rank. Brass buttons and white collar
patches on the same short wool jackets, breeches, and stockings lent some elegance to an
otherwise undistinguished appearance. There were, of course, exceptions. Boteler aboard
the frigate Orontes remarked, “We were considered a crack ship, and the midshipmen
dressed in cocked hats, tight white pantaloons and Hessian boots, with gilt twist edging
and a bullion tassel.” 50 Such sartorial splendor suggested a predominance of well-heeled
boys, a far cry from Boteler’s shipmate aboard Dictator who had to make the best of his
limited resources. John Jones “a young Welsh lad, very good-humoured . . . had nothing
but his pay, and yet he was the neatest dressed midshipman in the ship, his ‘weekly
account’ kept so white with pipe-clay.”51 For some quarterdeck boys, affectations of
elegance drew the wrath of senior officers who equated genteel standards of costume
with signs of effeminacy and weakness. James Anthony Gardner, a midshipman aboard
the Edgar in 1789, recalled an incident that brought the wrath his Admiral, the Honorable
John Leveson Gower, down upon a fellow petty officer. “He [Gower] was a mortal foe to
puppyism, and one of our midshipmen going aloft with gloves on, attracted his eye; for
which he got a rub down that I am certain he remembers to the present day. . . .”52
Such instances provided brutal reminders of the distance, both physical and
symbolic, separating naval and civilian life. Aboard His Majesty’s ships young
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gentlemen, regardless of their background or social hauteur, worked, slept, ate, and
dressed in ways that offered little of the comfort or distinction afforded by life ashore.
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PART I – SELECTING YOUNG GENTLEMEN FOR SEA SERVICE
Noble Rot
The Earl St. Vincent’s audience with King George III, 1807:
[A]nd the King asked him: “Well Lord St. Vincent you have now quitted active
service, as you say forever, - tell me do you think the Naval service is
better off or worse than when you first entered it?”
Lord St. Vincent: “Very much worse may it please Your Majesty.”
The King very quickly: “How so? How so?”
Lord St. Vincent: “Sire, I have always thought that a sprinkling of nobility was
very desirable in the Navy, as it gives some sort of consequence to the
service; but at present the Navy is so overrun by the younger branches of
nobility, and the sons of Members of Parliament, and they swallow up all
the patronage, and so choke the channel to promotion, that the son of an
old Officer, however meritorious both their services may have been, has
little or no chance of getting on.”
The King: “Pray who was serving Captain of the Fleet under your Lordship?”
Lord St. Vincent: “Rear Admiral Osborne, Sire, the son of an old Officer.”
The King: “Osborne! Osborne! I think there are many more than one of that name
Admirals.”
Lord St Vincent: “Yes Sire, there are three brothers, all Admirals.”
The King: “That’s pretty well for democracy, I think.”
Lord St. Vincent: “Sire, - the father of these officers served twenty years as First
Lieutenant, with my dear friend Admiral Barrington, who had never
sufficient interest to get him beyond the rank of Commander. He was of
necessity obliged to send all his sons to sea, and to my knowledge, they
never had anything more to live on than their pay . . . they got on in the
service upon the strength of their own merits alone; and Sire, I hope Your
Majesty will pardon me for saying, I would rather promote the son of an
old deserving Officer than any Noble in the land.”
The King mused for a minute or two, and then said, “I think you’re right Lord St.
Vincent, quite right.”1
As apocryphal as this account appears, it nonetheless reflects opinions
representative of the feelings of both the former First Lord and his sovereign about the
excess of aristocratic young men in the service and its adverse effect on an institution that
traditionally represented a meritocracy. St. Vincent, however, took the point a step
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beyond the issue of individual merit, suggesting that a naval pedigree ought take
precedence over that of peerage.
Lewis’ data on the social status of Royal Navy officers’ parents relative to
promotion to flag rank testifies to St. Vincent’s concern. Between 1793 and 1815, sons of
baronets and peers accounted for 12 percent of the total sample of 1800 officers while
sons of “professional men,” those with naval, clerical, military, legal, civil, or medical
connections, accounted for 50 percent. In the arena of promotion, however, nearly 41
percent of baronets and peers advanced to Rear-Admiral’s rank or higher, while only 22
percent of professional sons managed to achieve the same success.2 The desirability and
prestige of a naval career, boosted by Prince William Henry’s appearance as a
quarterdeck boy, effectively began a constriction of opportunities for entry-level officers
based on social rank, despite George III’s ostensibly “democratic” ideals and nominal
sympathies.
Changing Selection
Rodger’s survey of the Royal Navy during the Seven Years’ War explores several
avenues open to boys with ambitions to officer rank. Captains’ servants represented those
boys of “respectable families” who entered not before the age of thirteen, or if a naval
officer’s son, not before the age of eleven.3 This theoretically allowed a certain amount of
general schooling and preparation in the navigational sciences before a young gentleman
went to sea. In practice, boys joined the service years earlier, taking advantage of the fact
that “the Navy [of the 1760s] was the only profession for a gentleman that did not require
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– indeed, did not admit – the application of money or influence.”4 For aristocratic
younger sons and the sons of impoverished nobility, as much as for sons of genteel,
professional, and merchant families, adventure afloat presented an attractive option to the
struggles of civilian life. For a small allowance, or in some cases no money at all, boys
could embark on a respectable, if socially unglamorous profession. Over the next six
years a boy might move between the ratings of able seaman, ordinary seaman,
midshipman, and back to captain’s servant on the ship’s muster. Such ratings were
meaningless in terms of shipboard duties, although they allowed a boy to gather the six
years sea-experience required for eligibility to the lieutenant’s examination.
The second method of rising to commissioned rank during the 1750s and 1760s
began on the lower deck, with those boys whose ability allowed them to vault the ranks
of warrant officers and land on the quarterdeck. This method harkened back to the
Cromwellian practice of elevating competent seamen to the quarterdeck via the
midshipman’s berth. Throughout the Seven Years’ War lower-deck promotion remained
a common practice.
The final method of entry came via the merchant service. Experience gained in
the East Indies, West Indies, or Baltic trades often presented young men with a chance to
impress naval captains with their skill and seamanship and secure a place as a potential
officer. In both the second and third instances, midshipmen and quarterdeck “boys”
tended to be older and more practically experienced. Lieutenant’s passing certificates
from 1759 reveal that 52 percent of young gentlemen passed their examination after six
years of service; however, only 16 percent of the 192 men and boys passed that year
entered the service at age fourteen. Twelve percent of applicants, the second largest
4

Rodger, Wooden, pp. 253-54.

29

group, were twenty-five years old at the time of passing.5 This represents a significant
number of older quarterdeck “boys” and suggests that a good proportion of would-be
officers came from ratings other than that of captain’s servant. With so diverse a pool of
hopefuls, the determining factor for success in each of these officer-entry cases was
ability. In the era of Anson and Hawke the maxim of merit remained firm: “without a
good reputation for professional ability, even the well connected [boy] fared badly.”6
By the start of the French Revolutionary Wars, the field of officer entry had
narrowed. The most popular age of entry remained fourteen, as six years’ experience with
two of those years rated midshipmen or master’s mate were still required in order to sit
the lieutenant’s examination at the minimum age of twenty.7 A shift, however, towards a
younger and more socially-elevated junior officer corps became apparent with the 1794
Order in Council and with the relatively lower incidence of “tarpaulin” midshipmen.
Lewis’ survey of officer entry shows that barely 3 percent of the total 3751 officers
created between 1793 and 1815 came from the lower deck while 86 percent entered as
quarterdeck boys in one form or another.8 In terms of age, 72 percent of the 285
lieutenants passed in 1805 entered at or before age sixteen, with 86 percent spending
between six and seven years at sea before sitting their examination.9 These figures reflect
a younger group of candidates and a more concentrated selection and grooming process
for young gentlemen. As Thomas Trotter, surgeon aboard HMS Terpsichore in 1802
noted in his A Practical Plan for Manning the Navy:
5
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No person will have the hardihood to contend that a seaman’s duty can be learned
in less than seven years or after 21 years of age. He must be accustomed to it from
boyhood, for no adult can ever be brought to endure the privation, dangers and
hardships which are inseparable from a sea life.10
In January 1806 the Admiralty under Charles Middleton, then Lord Barham,
issued its new Regulations and Instructions Relating to His Majesty’s Service at Sea, a
series of orders that allowed greater Admiralty intervention in day to day shipboard
activities including the management, if not the selection, of entry-level officers. The
regulations initiated a move towards more centralized forms of naval governance and laid
the foundations for future reforms which would, by 1815, eliminate the captain’s
monopoly on the selection of potential officers. The direction of 1815 which stated that
“no Midshipman should be received on board and entered in the Ship’s Books unless or
until he had received Admiralty Sanction,”11 instituted centralized approval of all young
gentlemen. This allowed the Lords Commissioners greater say in who came aboard His
Majesty’s ships and provided a means of controlling both the quantity and quality of new
recruits entering an already swollen officer corps.
Of the 291 passed lieutenants in 1814, a year that saw a substantial number of
ships paid off in anticipation of the peace, only 33 percent of midshipmen passed their six
to seven years at sea before seeking commissioned status. The largest group by far, 47
percent, spent only three and a half to five and a half years at sea before being allowed to
sit the examination for lieutenant. Of these, more than 50 percent were fourteen years old
or younger at their time of entry into the service.12 Despite the fact that the 1808
Regulations and Instructions lowered the minimum age for the lieutenant’s examination
10
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to nineteen,13 the most likely explanation for this mass of rapid and youthful promotions
during years of declining naval activity was the opportunity it afforded to “retire” young
gentlemen with the consolations of commissioned rank and half-pay, a benefit to which
midshipmen and volunteers were not entitled. This enabled the discreet removal of wellconnected but unpromising young gentlemen and provided an incentive for boys who
lacked real commitment to a naval career to “jump ship.” Despite its costs to the
government, promotion “out” relieved pressure on the narrow channel of promotion and
ensured a moderate level of professionalism within the ranks of midshipmen and petty
officers.
The trend that favored the sons of the patrician classes for volunteer appointments
gained momentum in the peace-time navy after 1815. Lewis notes that of the 834 postwar volunteers, 149, or nearly 18 percent, came from the ranks of peers and baronets.14
This represented an increase of 6 percent from those who entered during the war years.
When seen in relation to the size of the Royal Navy fleet, which shrank dramatically over
the twenty years from 1810 to 1830, the proportion of volunteer positions being awarded
to young Honorables increased significantly.
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Table 3. Royal Navy Fleets by Year
1760

1790

1795

1800

1804*

1805

1810

1815

1820

1830

SOTL

135

130

123

127

88

136

152

126

112

82

Cruisers

115

130

160

158

138

160

183

151

101

100

Small ships

51

16

28

43

-

33

63

73

35

35

Total

301

276

311

328

226*

329

398

350

248

217

Sources: Jan Glete, Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies, and State Building in Europe and America,
1500-1860, Vol. II (Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell, 1993), pp. 552-55. 1804 figures (*) are drawn from
Rodger, Command, pp. 615-17, and reflect St. Vincent’s decommissioning efforts during the Peace of
Amiens.
Notes: SOTL= ships of the line and 50s up until 1790, Cruisers= frigates and 50s after 1790, Small
ships=vessels 300-500 tons until 1790, 500-1000 tons after 1790. This category does not include sloops,
brigs, bomb vessels, schooners or cutters. Glete’s figures do not distinguish between ships on active service
and those “in ordinary” preparing for sea.

As the number of positions for officer candidates dwindled in the years after
Waterloo, competition for a place in the midshipman’s berth mounted. The political and
social elites added their weight to the pressure bearing down on both individual captains
and the Board of Admiralty. The result was a continued “gentrification” of the
quarterdeck, a move that testified to the pervasive sense of old-order social values within
the naval hierarchy.
In summary, the trend evidenced between the Seven Years’ War and the
Napoleonic Wars saw a younger, more gentlemanly group of quarterdeck boys eligible
for officer status. Although the gentrification of the midshipman’s berth began as a result
of selections made by individual captains, the outcome represented a gradual process of
Admiralty incursion upon the ultimate expression of a captain’s power – patronage. It
also represented a move towards centralized control of personnel matters.15 In the social
polarization of its officer corps and in the escalation of Admiralty control, which further
strengthened the position of the Lords Commissioners as players in wider political
15

Lewis, Social, p. 159.
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spheres, the Royal Navy assumed the characteristics of an ancien régime. Rodger
expresses the change as “a division [that] was slowly opening along a fault-line . . .
between those who were gentlemen by birth and those who were not.” The trend
reinforced old systems of social precedence and patrician hegemony and cultivated the
division of social rank that “was to become the central organizing principle of the ranks
and ratings of the Navy after 1815.”16
Sobriety, Diligence and Qualifications – the Ideal Young Gentleman
In 1787 Captain Cuthbert Collingwood wrote to a hopeful young officer, O. M.
Lane, dispensing his advice on a naval career:
you may depend on it, that it is more in your power than in anyone elses [sic] to
promote both your comfort and advancement. A strict unwearied attention to your
duty, and a complaisant and respectful behaviour, not only to your superiors, but
to every body, will ensure you their regard, and the reward will surely come, and I
hope soon, in the shape of preferment. . . . Let it be your ambition to be foremost
on all duty. Do not be a nice observer of turns, but present yourself ready for
everything. . . . Let your companions be such as yourself, or superior; for the
worth of a man will always be ruled by that of his company. . . . Read – let me
charge you to read. Study books that treat of your profession and of history . . .
Remember Lane, before you are five and twenty, you must establish a character
that will serve you all your life.17
Collingwood’s advice touched on the most important factors determining the success of
quarterdeck boys in the Royal Navy after the Seven Years’ War including education,
temperament, conduct, and perhaps most importantly, connections. In practice, and
perhaps contrary to Collingwood’s intentions, the first three of these factors tended to
reinforce the importance of the latter and contributed to the advent of a more genteel
midshipman’s berth. Gentlemanly conduct became a proxy for merit replacing, or at least
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standing alongside, the “Sobriety, Diligence, and Qualifications”18 traditionally
demanded of a quarterdeck boy and justifying the rapid pace of promotion for boys of
noble or high rank. Such allowances further supported impressions of a Royal Navy
devoted to maintaining the bulwarks of a patrician state.
Connections, Interest and Patronage
When it came to appointing young gentlemen and overseeing their advancement,
Collingwood’s faith in reward based on merit marked him as a member of the old school.
During the American War of Independence, Lord Sandwich famously distributed
appointments and promotions with remarkable impartiality to political and even royal
interest. In 1760 Sandwich responded to Lord Berkley’s protests over the denial of his
brother’s claims to promotion: “. . . there are many young men of fashion in the Navy
who are equally solicitous of preferment and their friends are equally pressing; your
Lordship will find on enquiry that my answer to all of them is the same, whatever their
connections may be.” In a final dig, Sandwich raised the issue of performance: “. . . if
Captain Berkley wishes to get out of his Fireship into an active Sloop in order to have a
greater probability of distinguishing himself, I shall very readily accommodate him when
a proper opening happens. . . .”19 As First Lord, Sandwich exhibited considerable loyalty
to naval tradition, placing seniority and the merits of distinguished service ahead of
aristocratic and political influence.
By the next round of conflict, however, few of Sandwich’s like-minded followers
remained. In 1809 Collingwood stood virtually alone in his advocacy of merit over
interest and was well aware of the oddity of his convictions: “You may have heard that I
18
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am reckoned rather queer in the promotion of young men. I advance a great many who
have not a friend to speak for them, while those I respect most in the world sometimes
plead in vain.”20 This statement, penned just a year before Collingwood’s death, perhaps
reflected not a little contempt for the omnipotence of the Admiralty board, which denied
his repeated requests to be retired from command of the Mediterranean Fleet. Rebellious
attitudes amongst captains towards the prevailing political winds were, however, far from
the norm. By the start of the French Revolutionary Wars the lure of political, financial,
and/or social gain to be had from the acceptance of well-connected boys, turned the heads
of most naval commanders capable of wielding patronage. This, combined with
increasing Admiralty interference in the appointment process, limited the field of eligible
boys considerably. Even Nelson, for all his celebrated flouting of regulations, was not
immune to pressure from above. To the Right Honorable William Windham who
solicited favor on behalf of a friend’s son, Nelson wrote, “. . . it is a fact although I can
hardly believe it that I am unable to send a Lad to Sea, the refusals I receive from the
Admiralty filling up every vacancy astonish me. . . .”21 To a fellow admiral Nelson
expressed similar anxieties in the wake of moves to centralize Admiralty control over
appointments and promotions:
I will explain to you exactly my power of promotion and you will then see the
very distant prospect I can have of obliging my friends. All Admiralty vacancies
are filled up by the First Lord of the Admiralty as by List given me. Nothing is
left to a Commander In Chief of the Present day but Deaths & dismissals by Court
Martials [sic]. . . .22
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Who then, managed a spot on this privileged list? Even prior to the start of the
French Revolutionary Wars, the roll sagged with social weight. Admiral Sir William
Henry Dillon, a notorious snob, remarked in his memoirs on the number of notables
present aboard HMS Alcide in 1790, where he entered as a captain’s servant at the age of
ten: “It was a truly pleasing circumstance to me to find that most of these young
gentlemen were highly connected – the names of some of them will satisfy you, such as
Byng, Herbert, Digby, Pigot and Ayscough.”23 The aristocratic and naval-political
connections of these young men reflected the growing outside influence upon the
Admiralty board in the last decades of the century.
St. Vincent, as First Lord of the Admiralty from February 1801 to May 1804,
castigated his predecessor, the 2nd Earl Spencer, for his shameless use of patronage and
his abuse of the appointment process as a means of satisfying family and friends. Such
rectitude, however, did not take precedence over St. Vincent’s Whig politics or extend to
his own relations. To the commander-in-chief of the North American station he wrote:
This will be delivered to you by Captain Fane of the Driver, son of Mr Fane,
Member of the County of Oxford, who is sent out to you with a view to his being
promoted to the rank of post-captain . . . Captain Fane is a near relation of mine
and every way worthy of your good offices and protection.24
When it came to dealing with the budding career of a “listed” candidate such as the son
of Lord Radstock, Nelson’s tone, too, was much altered:
Relative to your Son . . . you may rely my Dear Lord that I will take the earliest
opportunity after he has served his time of promoting him, if we do not take
particular care of the children of our Brethren we should assume to be reprobated
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and when those Children come with more merit than others they have a double
claim to our notice.25
Nelson redeemed such blatant sycophancy with the justification of merit. Nominally,
merit remained the distinguishing feature between the use of patronage in the army and in
the Royal Navy. But while proof of one’s ability remained an important factor in the
promotion of sea officers, it played little or no role in the appointment of young
gentlemen whose age and inexperience allowed small opportunity to prove themselves
through service. Boys over the age of thirteen were, however, expected to bring with
them knowledge of navigation and mathematics, skills that marked them for command.
Yet even boys from the pinnacle of educated society often lacked such fundamental
training. Admiral Lord Thomas Cochrane lamented the incompetence of elite quarterdeck
recruits: “. . . of the many [young] officers furnished to me through parliamentary
influence, it can be only said that they were seldom trusted . . . I considered it preferable,
on pressing occasions, to do their duty myself. . . .”26 But for all the social and political
pressure exerted on the Admiralty, and consequently forced down the chain of command,
the skills of basic seamanship remained crucial to the effectiveness of a budding officer.
Without a minimal level of professional ability on the quarterdeck, the Royal Navy might
have collapsed under the weight of its own incompetence. Self-preservation forced a
certain moderation in the Royal Navy’s promotion of young gentlemen who were also
backed by powerful interest. As unwieldy as the problem of over-mighty, under-trained
young gentlemen might have appeared to traditionalists such as Collingwood, St.
Vincent, and Nelson, who generally valued merit above all, the Royal Navy never
endured the kind of patronage plague that infected land-based military institutions. As
25
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Lewis notes of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century navy, “it must be
admitted that merit always counted for something, though not for so much as it should.”27
The Three “Rs”
During the course of the Great Wars, opportunities for entry-level officers
narrowed to those with more formal academic foundations. The days of young,
unschooled officers such as Ramblin’ Jack’s Captain John Cremer, who began his seacareer in 1708 and prospered in the service for nearly seventy years thereafter, were over
by the start of the French Revolutionary Wars. While Bellamy’s comment in the
introduction to Cremer’s journal smacks of anachronistic bias – “A man so astonishing in
his orthography would [in 1936] hardly be allowed to become a police constable, let
alone a master mariner”28 – it is a judgment that gained currency in the Royal Navy of the
late-eighteenth century. As a ten year-old “youngster” in his first appointment, Dillon
recalled with pride his introduction to Captain Sir Andrew Douglas of the Alcide, who
expressed delight “when I told him that I had partly been educated in France,” whereupon
Sir Andrew “made a few observations on the necessity of naval officers being familiar
with foreign languages.”29 Poor Cremer was only loosely familiar with his native English.
Dillon had been well-schooled at an early age, although his education did not end
when he came aboard Alcide. The ship’s schoolmaster, Mr. Humphreys, conducted
classes in navigation and general studies, “from 9 o’clock in the morning till 12: [and] in
the afternoon from 2 till 4.”30 Contrary to the general impression cast by Humphreys’ less
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rigorous contemporaries, he performed his pedagogical duties with skill and diligence.
The author of the diary from HMS Gibraltar in 1811 appeared to be the tutor (and
brother) of Frederick Gilly, a fifteen year-old midshipman. The tutor’s efforts represented
the more haphazard type of education available to young gentlemen aboard ship. His
entry of May 20 noted:
Wrote out some mathematics for Frederick and at first endeavoured to instruct
him in that branch of knowledge, but as I found he could make little [progress?]
without the necessary books, I gave it up and substituted geography in its
place . . . and found that he made every improvement I could wish. . . . 31
Mr. Macbride, the schoolmaster of the seventy-four gun Edgar in 1787, was a “drunken
and obscene” man who inspired little scholastic progress among the midshipmen in his
charge but did provide them with a subject for lampoons and practical jokes.32 Despite
the sometimes dubious advantages of a tutor at sea, naval schoolmasters were rare, even
by the close of the eighteenth century, appearing primarily in first rates and flag ships.33
Not until 1806 did the service make warrant-officer status available to schoolmasters,
thus encouraging a higher caliber of instructor to enlist and making practicable the
instruction of boys at sea. For the most part, however, young gentlemen were better off in
shore-based schools which offered skilled instructors and a greater scope of study.
Lord Cochrane entered the service in 1793 as a midshipman at the ripe age of
seventeen. While his maturity obviated the need for extensive shipboard schooling, the
first chapter of Cochrane’s autobiography is a meticulous chronicle of his education
relative to the changing fortunes of his family. From private French tutors, to instruction
31
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in the military sciences by retired army sergeants, to a spell at Mr. Chauvet’s “excellent”
school in Kensington, Cochrane made clear the high value ascribed to education among
naval officers in the last decade of the eighteenth century.34
The trend towards preparing boys with educations relevant to a career as a naval
officer can be traced to Charles II’s foundation of Christ’s Hospital School for the Navy.
Established in 1673 to train “40 poor boys . . . in the art of navigation,”35 such altruism on
behalf of the underprivileged, in fact, ran contrary to the new century’s attempts to raise
the social status of naval officers. The Royal Naval Academy opened to students in
Portsmouth in 173336 with the express purpose of raising crops of aristocratic or
gentlemanly young officers. Limited to forty places, the Academy cost between ₤70 and
₤80 a year, too rich for the vast majority of the middling sort. Measures were taken in
later years, however, to open fifteen of these positions to the sons of naval officers.
Poor administration and an equally poor reputation for turning out ignorant young
debauchers meant that the Academy was rarely full and subsequently “had little impact
on the Navy as a whole.”37 Expansion and reform of school operations in the 1790s saw
some improvement in the proficiency of its graduates. Of the 288 passed lieutenants for
1805, 10 entered the service as scholars, receiving between two and four and a half year’s
sea-time credit while at school.38 These small numbers justified assessments past and
present, that the total impact of the Academy on the service was negligible. St. Vincent’s
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opinion of the school as a “sink of vice and abomination”39 did not improve with time.
Re-christened in 1806 as the Royal Naval College, the school’s capacity increased to
seventy students.40 The effort, however, proved to be too little too late in a navy with less
than ten years of the war left to run.
Most quarterdeck boys were expected to come aboard with a suitable general
education in reading, writing, mathematics, trigonometry, and the rudiments of
navigation as captains recognized the difficulty of perfecting such disciplines amidst the
distractions of a ship. Boys were encouraged to take leave of their ship for a year or two
between the ages of twelve and fourteen in order to refine their education ashore. James
Anthony Gardner left HMS Conqueror at the age of seven to go to school ashore, having
entered the service at age five.41 While at school a boy’s sea time continued to accrue
such that they returned to their ships with no loss of seniority. Armed with a solid
grounding in navigation, perfection of the art continued aboard ship, under the guidance
of a captain or first lieutenant. Even as an admiral, Collingwood paid particular attention
to the scholastic progress of the boys in his charge. To his friend J. E. Blackett, he wrote:
Young _____ appears to me to be a very good, mild-tempered boy, and I will
leave nothing undone which is in my power to promote his knowledge and
interests. He is studying geometry with me, and I keep him close to his books. It
is a pity, as he was not intended for the sea-service, that he has not been taught
navigation; but I will at least prepare him for a better master.42
As the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars progressed, pressure from the twin
forces of politics and patronage mounted, resulting in the appearance of aristocratic boys
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on quarterdecks throughout the Royal Navy who possessed little or no maritime
schooling. In 1801 Collingwood addressed the shortcomings of one young gentleman
proffered by his friend Mrs. Moutray:
He is as well-bred, gentlemanly a young man as can be, and I dare say an
excellent fox hunter, for he seems skilful in horses, dogs, foxes and such animals.
But unluckily . . . these are branches of knowledge not very useful at sea, we do
not profit by them off Ushant.43
A year later Collingwood’s problems with young gentlemen continued. In another letter
to Blackett he complained:
I was surprised to see Mr _____ come out again. They think, when they have
served six years at sea, they should be made Lieutenants, and never deem it
necessary to qualify themselves. He is a good, quiet young man, and walks about
doing no harm; but he has no activity in him. Such people become pensioners
upon the Navy, rather than officers in it.44
Despite such cases, the increasing emphasis on high educational standards for future
officers stemmed from two necessities. The first reflected the need for greater
competency not only in seamanship and navigation but in the administrative duties of
midshipmen and quarterdeck boys. Since the circulation of Lord Howe’s order book for
HMS Magnanime in 1759, 45 the responsibilities of midshipmen had expanded to include
management of watch, station, and quarter bills for a sub-division and accountability for
the slops (clothing), personal property, and the cleanliness of the men, the details of
which were to be recorded in accurate and legible reports. By the later years of the
Napoleonic Wars the educational demands were even greater. Between 1811 and 1815,
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Captain Cumby of the Hyperion required that midshipmen
send in to the Captain each day, at sea, as soon as may be after noon, their own
account, of the ship’s way and position as ascertained by log, chronometer and
lunar observation. The latter methods of measuring longitude are most earnestly
recommended to the constant practice and attention of all the Mates and
Midshipmen, as a branch of professional knowledge not only highly creditable,
but absolutely and indispensably necessary to the character of a British Naval
Officer.46
The second need fulfilled by a corps of educated junior officers was the
preservation of the quarterdeck as the realm of the gentleman. Education generally
provided the dividing line between gentility and the rest. As a function of wider social
issues, education merged with perceptions of genteel behaviour equating the two, often
wrongly, with a temperament suitable for a sea officer.
Temperament, Conduct, and the Appearance of a Gentleman
One of the consequences of heading to sea at a very young age was that boys,
even aristocratic ones, seldom received the kind of polish that could be acquired ashore,
such that “polite society was apt to view the sea-officers with some disdain.”47 Nelson’s
advice to Emma Hamilton’s cousin Charles Conner upon his being rated midshipman in
the Niger, reiterated the need to uphold a code of conduct indicative of the naval officer’s
desired image: “I trust that your future conduct in life will prove you both an officer and
a gentleman. Recollect that you must be a seaman to be an officer, and also, you cannot
be a good officer without being a gentleman.”48
Wise words, though what lasting impact they effected on a scrum of prematurelyempowered teenage boys is doubtful. John Harvey Boteler, a gentleman’s son who went
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to sea in 1808 at the age of twelve, recounted a series of scrapes involving the thrashing
of bullying fellow midshipmen, the theft of his captain’s fresh-boiled plum pudding, and
the smashing of the purser’s store of lanterns as retribution for the “miserable dips we
were allowed for lighting the berth.”49 Dillon, too, recounted scenes of Gun Room cutlass
duels and quarterdeck fisticuffs with bullying midshipmen, although his more genteel
sensibilities were thoroughly offended by “the scenes of licentiousness, drunkenness,
swearing and immorality to which I could not help being a witness.”50
Drunkenness presented a paradox in late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century
society and within the Royal Navy itself. Cochrane boasted “never in my life to have
been inebriated,” while simultaneously remarking that “those were days [1797-98] when
even gentlemen did not consider it a demerit to drink hard.”51 Nor, at least in naval terms,
was it inappropriate to start young. Lord Bernard Coleridge writing to his father at age
eleven remarked that “wine is no luxury to me, for I have two glasses at dinner every day
and two at supper, which is my half allowance, I not liking grog.”52 Coleridge was
fortunate to have had an option in his choice of beverage. Even Captain James Gambier,
or “Preaching Jemmy” as he came to be styled by seamen resentful of his dogmatic
Methodism, allowed a most uncharacteristic “splicing of the main-brace” at Christmas
1793, whereby virtually every man and boy aboard the seventy-four gun Defence became
blind drunk.53 A mariner’s access to beer, wine, and spirits, guaranteed by ancient naval
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traditions,54 sadly outlasted the general middle-class tolerance for drunkenness.
Increasingly popular evangelical religious movements also lauded the merits of
temperance, equating sobriety with superior moral standards and thereby appealing to all
those with at least pretensions to gentility.
The Royal Navy of the Napoleonic Wars, still smarting from the mutinies of
1797, adopted harder lines on excessive drinking as a means of effecting greater control
over a ship’s company. Captain Edward Codrington’s “Black List” from HMS Blake in
1812-13 recorded 122 crimes of drunkenness and repeated drunkenness out of a total of
174. The most popular punishment meted out for these defaulters was twelve to twentyfour lashes.55 Young gentlemen who overindulged, even wealthy, well-connected ones,
were seldom tolerated. Boys deemed incurable gin-soaks often found themselves turned
out of their ship or quietly dismissed from the service. Robert Wilson recorded in his
journal on New Years’ Eve, 1806, the case of a fellow midshipman, Mr. Litchfield,
whose over-imbibing earned him a ticket home from the American station:
He [Litchfield] had been but a little time back, severely punished for intoxication
and behaving himself in an ungentleman-like manner, repeatedly; he was but a
youth, and Captain Campbell wished to get him home, for he found remonstrating
with him was in vain.56
Summaries of courts martial for quarterdeck boys, midshipmen, and acting-lieutenants
from 1794 to 1815,57 however, reveal a relatively low incidence of charges for
drunkenness testifying, perhaps in part, to a growing perception that temperance marked
the gentleman, at least on the quarterdeck.
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In the opinions of some senior commanders, there were far worse shortcomings
than drunkenness and youthful mischief. Collingwood valued qualities of temperament
and self-motivation that predisposed a boy to life as a sea officer. To his sister Mrs. Stead
he complained:
Mrs Currel’s son never can be a sailor: he has something very odd in his manner,
or rather he has no manner at all, but saunters a melancholic for a week together,
unnoticing and unnoticed, except when I give him a little rally to make his blood
circulate . . . It is a pity [his mother] had not put him apprentice to Jno. Wilson,
the apothecary . . . His gravity would have established his reputation as a learned
doctor, and if he did poison an old woman now and then, better to do that than
drown an entire ship’s company at a dash by running on the rocks.58
Without the spirit and fortitude for a naval career, a boy’s gentility and the virtues of his
social rank mattered little to commanders like Collingwood. Young James Gardner
recounted the instance of a fellow midshipman so terrified by the prospect of engagement
that he “ran from his quarters and positively hid in the coppers! and had put on the
drummer’s jacket” as a means of disguise. The offending midshipman “got well flogged”
by the boatswain for his cowardice.59
The initiative exhibited by fifteen year-old Frederick Gilly aboard the Gibraltar in
1811 indicated a demeanor far more suitable for an officer. Determined to demonstrate
his courage by participating in a potentially dangerous mission ashore, Frederick stowed
away in one of the ship’s boats after a senior officer refused to include him in the landing
party. Frederick revealed himself only after it was too late to return to the ship and fought
bravely in the ensuing action amidst heavy musket fire.60 Although details of Frederick’s
parentage are unknown, his behaviour exemplified the kind of heroic and gentlemanly
conduct expected of budding officers. A vigourous, oftentimes blind pursuit of honor,
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regardless of the risks, set the standard for young gentlemen with a desire to rise in their
profession, particularly if little interest could be called upon to boost their career.
While it would be unfair and inaccurate to generalize that aristocratic young
gentlemen exhibited less of the “right stuff,” resting instead on the laurels of influence, it
is safe to argue that for those without interest the options were few. An anonymous young
officer summed up the limitations for the unconnected: “a fellow has now no chance of
promotion unless he jumps into the muzzle of a gun and crawls out of the touchole
[sic].”61 Such a lament suggested that little or no outside influence favored this young
gentleman, a shortcoming which left only one route to recognition – that of uncommon
valor. In the years following Trafalgar the opportunity for displays of “desperate
service”62 faded along with the grand fleet action and the last avenues to appointment by
merit narrowed to a virtual impasse, clogged by social precedence and an infrastructure
that supported the older order.
The economics of officer entry also reflected the narrowing opportunities for boys
at sea. As captain’s servants, boys, and first class volunteers received no pay; families
were expected to provide an allowance to cover a young man’s messing, schooling (if a
schoolmaster was present aboard ship), uniforms, and general expenses. The amount
demanded for this allowance rose dramatically over the course of the century. In 1733
five guineas sufficed a peer’s son who sought a position as a captain’s protégé, while in
1748 John Jervis, who later became the Earl St. Vincent, was packed off with a mere ₤20.
By the time William Dillon went to sea in 1790 his captain required a minimum
allowance of ₤50 a year, a sum that allowed boys “to live up to their gentlemanly
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claims.”63 Such an amount also eliminated a good number of potential recruits from the
professional and lower orders. Without family interest in the form of Captain Maurice
Suckling, who absorbed much of the expense, it is doubtful that Nelson’s father, a
Norfolk parson, could have raised the money to send his son to sea.64 Finances thus
narrowed the field considerably and endowed a naval career with greater social prestige.
It is interesting that Dillon, over the course of his memoirs from 1790 until about
1796, mentioned frequently the gentlemanly nature of his messmates, but following his
appointment to acting-lieutenant in 1796, noted a general “falling off of gentility” in the
Royal Navy’s junior-officer corps. On this score Lewis suggests, “It would perhaps be
comforting to think that Dillon and his friends were on the way out, and that a more
democratic officer entry was on its way in. But History does not bear this out.”65 Perhaps
a slightly older, more class-conscious66 Dillon began to register the difference between a
gentleman by birth and connections, and one deemed so merely by manners and
appearance. Dillon’s concern that naval officers ought possess, at the very least, a
gentlemanly pedigree is indicative of the swing towards a narrower social field of
opportunity. Dillon and his contemporaries represented the next generation of command
beyond the self-made peers like Jervis, Nelson, and Collingwood. While the legacy of
these heroic figures shaped conceptions of officer-like conduct and honor for generations
to come, the tradition which automatically equated a lieutenant’s commission with
genteel status now required qualification. For captains like Dillon, the future of the Royal
63
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Navy’s officer corps relied as much on circumstances of birth as on suitability of
temperament and conduct. Dillon saw the introduction of Admiralty “nomination” in
1815 as a boon to the social integrity of the service rather than an infringement on what
would then have been his own prerogative as captain:
I was glad to find that some kind of regulation was to be enforced in that
direction, as it was well known that many Captains had placed improper youths
on the Quarter Decks of the King’s Ships. The Navy has much improved in
consequence of that arrangement, and now you are nearly certain of having a
young gentleman in the profession, whereas formerly there were many of very
doubtful character in it.67
Summary
By the time of the French Revolutionary Wars the trend that had begun with
Prince William Henry’s admission into the service as a quarterdeck boy became a fullyfledged movement, significant enough to draw the attention of many prominent naval
commentators. The heightened social status of a naval career increased its popularity for
the sons of aristocrats and the highest ranking gentlemen. While the Order in Council of
1794 decreased the number of official positions for officers-in-training, limiting the entry
of first class boys and volunteers to “young gentlemen intended for sea service,” demand
for these positions multiplied. The result was a gradual but unmistakable rise in the
proportion of entry-level positions being awarded to the sons of the social and political
elite, a growth attested to by the number of “Honorables” passed as lieutenants in Steel’s
Navy Lists of the period.68
The victims in this new social equation spanned the breadth of both social and
naval ranks. While the Admiralty technically assumed no place in the selection and
appointment of quarterdeck boys until 1815, captains found their prerogative squeezed
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well before this time by social influences outside the navy and by political pressures
forced down through the First Lord and the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.
Constraints on a captain’s freedom to appoint took their toll on those who, in the past,
had been most favored – the sons of fellow officers and career warrants. Considering
these boys most deserving by virtue of a father’s service, old-school captains like
Collingwood continued to select boys from the “professional” ranks. But as the
Admiralty maintained its slow but inexorable advance towards centralized control of
appointments, even the most democratic commanders were forced to bow. By 1815 the
transition from captain’s selection to Admiralty-approved nomination was complete, as
was the process which facilitated the social polarization of the midshipman’s berth. By
the 1850s, the cockpit would be dominated by the sons of aristocrats and gentlemen.69
The separation of the social orders – lower-deck commoners and quarterdeck gentlemen
– remained a prominent feature of the late Georgian and Victorian navies.
In terms of broader social trends, the Royal Navy’s transition from a largely
independent institution that thrived on its ability to subvert the order of traditional
eighteenth-century society, to a centralized bureaucracy governed by forces from above,
supports Clarke’s theory of a continuing ancien régime. While the nature of the Royal
Navy in the first half of the eighteenth century exemplified Langford’s notion of an
evolving social order, one which valued mobility and opportunity based on ability, such
characteristics were permitted only by default. While the Royal Navy remained a socially
undesirable profession-of-last-resort, the selection of young officers operated “below the
radar” of the social elite. As soon as tastes and perceptions of a naval career changed, so
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did the ability of the Royal Navy to maintain its independence in matters of appointment
and advancement. As such, the demands of the old order triumphed despite the protracted
death throes of a more egalitarian Royal Navy. As a gentlewoman and author with two
brothers in active naval service, Jane Austen was well placed to observe high society’s
attitudes towards the opportunities afforded by the Royal Navy. In 1815 she captured one
popular position in the voice of Sir Walter Elliott, Baronet. Elliott objected to the naval
profession
as being the means of bringing persons of obscure birth into undue distinction,
and raising men to honours which their fathers and grandfathers never dreamt
of . . . A man is in greater danger in the navy of being insulted by the rise of those
whose father, his father might have disdained to speak to . . . than in any other
line.70
Such commentary reflected wider perceptions among members of the elite that favored
even greater separation of the social orders. It was an opinion that William Dillon would
have wholeheartedly supported.
Clark’s system of patrician hegemony, which allows flexibility and movement
within the framework of an old social order, explains trends evident in the Royal Navy by
the last quarter of the eighteenth century. In a profession which depended on skill for
survival, advancement based on professional ability remained the central organizing
principle of command. What changed, however, was opportunity. Precedence given to
the sons of the elite in the competition for limited appointments brought a new crop of
aristocratic and gentlemanly hopefuls into positions of naval command. For the new
breed of quarterdeck boys, and for the majority of those they commanded, such a trend
represented the ordinary extension of privileges to the natural leaders of society.
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PART II – THE AUTHORITY OF YOUNG GENTLEMEN
The Evolution of Naval Authority in the Eighteenth Century
The wooden world of the late-seventeenth century was a far cry from the scenes
of rigid discipline, professionalism, and cast-iron authority so evocative of Nelson’s
navy. At Lowestoft in 1666, the incompetent and unpopular Admiral Lord Buckingham
begged his men not to throw him overboard and barely escaped with his life from several
shipboard riots.1 At the opposite end of the scale, Thomas Masterman Hardy, Victory’s
captain at Trafalgar, proudly worked his ship in silence, directing his well-oiled human
machine with hand signals and the occasional twittering of the boatswain’s call. Despite
the unmistakable transition from a state of “chaotic discipline” to one of high-order
efficiency, the Royal Navy continued to operate on a tenuous thread of authority that
“rested more on persuasion than force.”2 The mathematics of shipboard life proved that
consent was the crucial factor as eight hundred men could not be commanded by thirty or
forty officers and boys without both tacit and explicit approval.
The Admiralty of the previous century had demonstrated surprising obedience to
the demands of its seamen, allowing them to dispose of captains who did not meet their
professional standards, as in the Rainsborough mutiny of 1648.3 By the turn of the
eighteenth century, such liberal attitudes towards mariners were largely extinct, although
the potential threat posed by the lower deck remained foremost in the minds of all
sensible commanders. The Admiralty’s first attempt to codify discipline and standards of
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duty came with the issue of the first General Printed Instructions4 in 1731. Additional
Regulations and Instructions produced in 1733 and 1756 dealt increasingly with issues
relating to the living conditions and work expectations of mariners and reflected concerns
for the treatment of crews. The advent of Captains’ Order Books in 1759 brought to light
the shortcomings of the Admiralty’s instructions and emphasized the need for individual
captains to clarify issues that affected daily life aboard ship. By the mid to late 1780s,
concern for the treatment of seaman was evident in a number of order books including,
rather surprisingly, those drafted by Prince William Henry, Duke of Clarence and captain
of HMS Pegasus. Though a martinet on issues of protocol, discipline, dress, and
cleanliness, Clarence demanded that “no seamen, marine or other person in the ship is to
be struck or otherways ill used on any pretence whatsoever by any officer or
gentleman . . .” and that “. . . the people [an official term for a ship’s company] [are]
never to be interrupted at their meals but on the most pressing occasions.”5 Such orders
were in wide circulation by the early 1790s and mirrored a general respect for the most
basic rights of seamen.
Yet the concessions proved insufficient to ameliorate the hardships facing
mariners of the age. In 1797 tensions erupted in the greatest internal crisis of the
eighteenth-century Royal Navy – the Spithead mutiny. Unlike its successor at the Nore,
the mutineers of the Channel Fleet at Portsmouth achieved their aims with dignity,
eloquence, and moderation, forcing those in positions of power to re-evaluate the
capabilities of the average tar and the license granted to naval officers. The responses of
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individual captains to the mutiny were, however, varied. St. Vincent reacted with
characteristic ruthlessness, implementing a harsh system of discipline for both the men
and officers.
The severity of his methods did not suit captains and admirals who recognized
more effective means of managing a ship’s company. Many noted that humane treatment
of the men and a heightened consideration for their comfort often delivered more
immediate and more enduring results. Concern for the use and abuse of seamen,
particularly on the issue of their being called on deck unnecessarily, led Captain Keats of
HMS Superb to order that “the commanding officer is directed to avoid so much as
possible the calling of all hands but when the service to be performed cannot be executed
by the watch and idlers. . . .”6 Directions of this nature were echoed in many order books
of the period. Captain Anselm John Griffiths expanded upon such ideas in his
Observations on Some Points of Seamanship written in 1811:
Another thing which annoys the ship’s company is the calling of all hands for
what the watch can do. They know as well as you do when there is a necessity and
they come cheerfully when they see that necessity, but it is natural they should
feel annoyed at being taken from their amusements or little private employments
because an officer they ought to look up to either does not know what strength is
requisite or is unmindful of their comfort.7
Directives such as this reflected not only a heightened sensibility for the patience of
lower-deck men but for the dangers of officers who appeared incompetent.
These examples of evolving attitudes towards the proper use of naval authority
suggested a measure of change in the social dynamics of the shipboard hierarchy. In
wider social terms, the effects of commercialism and an expanding middle class forced
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the acceptance of more liberal attitudes towards the lower and middling orders.
Radicalism in the form of revolutionary politics, leveling religion, and Romantic visions
of “the rights of man” penetrated all strata of society, inspiring the lower orders as
effectively as upper-class intellectuals. But the revolution in France proved too bloody
for English tastes and the warnings of Edmund Burke resonated with terrible clarity.
The mutinies of 1797 could hardly have been better timed to capitalize on a wellmatured sense of impending social doom brought about by the political threats from both
Jacobins and the United Irishmen. Yet, the apolitical demands of the mutineers at
Portsmouth suggested only a tepid challenge to the old order; while Admiralty
negotiators downplayed the severity of the mutineers’ threat as a means of containing the
potentially contagious ideas of rebellion which might infect other fleets and English
society at large. As such, parties on both sides of the Spithead mutiny worked to preserve
traditional social hierarchies, displaying what Clark describes as an unspoken “solidarity”
in English conceptions of the kingdom and the role of its subjects. While conflict in a
realm so economically and socially diverse was inevitable, the two pillars of English
society, law and religion, combined to reaffirm the divine right of the elite to rule at sea
and on land. The bloodless success of the Spithead mutiny arose from the moderation of
the seamen involved, their deference to the authority of both the crown and the
Admiralty, and a complete renunciation of political motives. Conversely, “Parker’s
Floating Republic” as the HMS Sandwich came to be known while under the control of
Seaman Richard Parker (a disrated midshipman) during the Nore mutiny, failed utterly
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and ended with Parker and twenty-seven of his collaborators hanged from the yardarm of
their shattered “Republic”.8
Other apparently progressive social measures such as the Duke of Clarence’s
concern for his men at mealtimes, merely repeated the most fundamental of time-honored
concessions awarded to England’s mariners and reflected the understanding that navies,
as well as armies, fought on their stomachs. The liberal attitudes espoused by Anselm
Griffiths did not undermine the authority of command but, in fact, encouraged higher
standards of professionalism and honor among officers, thereby eliciting greater respect
from the lower deck which cemented quarterdeck hegemony. As professional standards
for officers sharpened with the onset of the Napoleonic Wars, the natural authority of
aristocrats and gentlemen may have demanded polishing, but nonetheless emerged as the
choice of British seamen. The opinion that the men preferred a smattering of gentility in
their commanders9 echoed widespread contemporary beliefs in the old hierarchy, and the
stability it represented. Such notions challenge Rodger’s observation that “the 1797
Mutinies fundamentally changed the attitudes of officers and men throughout the
Navy. . . .”10 The trickle-down effect of these popular sentiments on the authority, both
practical and theoretical, of midshipmen and quarterdeck boys is examined below.
Quarterdeck Boys as a Measure of Change
Adjustments to Admiralty policy regarding the nature of command and the
manner in which it wielded authority were best instituted at the entry level. As such, the
authority granted to quarterdeck boys, the duties expected of them, and the bounds of
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their acceptable behavior provided a telling measure of social climates. An examination
of internal factors such as Admiralty regulations, orders set by individual captains, and
the influence of the lower deck combined with a look at external factors including
religion, politics, and education provides a fuller picture of the influences that affected
the authority of quarterdeck boys. The play of internal and external factors appeared in
characterizations of the new shipboard hierarchy – a structure that aligned more closely
with its civilian counterpart as the Great Wars progressed. Despite fluctuations and
challenges to the social order of the Royal Navy throughout the period, the social world
aboard Georgian men-of-war, ultimately supported an ancien régime.
Internal Sources of Authority
The Admiralty
A portion of a young gentleman’s authority aboard ship resulted from Admiralty
directives that reflected the policies of the Privy Council. Orders in Council addressing
royal policy on naval manning and operational issues, as well as the demands of various
First Lords and Admiralty boards, inspired various drafts of the Royal Navy’s
Regulations and Instructions. The first edition in 1731 outlined the functions of
midshipmen and quarterdeck boys and their status in the shipboard hierarchy in only the
barest sense. The 1756 regulations attempted to clarify a young gentleman’s status with
the introduction of a uniform “in order to their carrying the appearance which is
necessary to distinguish their class to be in the rank of gentlemen, and give them better
credit for executing the commands of their superior officers. . . .”11 In the 1806 draft,
midshipmen appeared to have moved beyond the insecurities associated with the
appearance of authority, as the articles dealt primarily with expectations of their
11
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competency as seamen, able to “hand, reef and steer;” as administrators, able to maintain
accurate logs; and as leaders of men, responsible for the cleanliness, sobriety,
proficiency, and general welfare of their sub-divisions.12
Another source of authority from the top, which related to young gentlemen as
much as to admirals, came from of the “Articles of War.” Established by the
Commonwealth navy, amended by George II in 1747, and again in 1757, the Articles
prescribed thirty-six points of law designed to accommodate all disciplinary
contingencies, from drunkenness and insubordination to cowardice and murder. Articles
19, 20, and 2213 addressed breaches of conduct with respect to shipboard hierarchies and
cemented the authority of the quarterdeck, its boys included, with the threat of death
looming over any lower-deck seaman or subordinate officer who dared rattle the chain of
command.
Both these sources protected the authority of young gentleman with the weight of
law. As a cornerstone of English society, the immutability of these laws remained
unquestioned, even by those who perished under their rule. During the Nore mutiny, one
seaman decided to spare the life of young Lieutenant Nieven who had, the previous day
sentenced the man to a flogging. The seaman explained his reasoning, “You did, [flog
me] Sir, but I deserved it.” The rest of the seaman’s response spoke to wider social
justifications: “You are a gentleman, and a good officer. You never punished men but
when they were in fault, and you did it as an officer ought to do.” A flogging from a
gentleman was clearly more acceptable than one from an officer such as the First
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Lieutenant of the same ship who was “a blackguard and no gentleman.”14 Naval law
typically passed without question, particularly when meted out by worthy possessors of
the natural authority granted by aristocratic or gentlemanly birth. The system of authority
handed down from the highest levels of Admiralty administration depended to a large
extent on the elite status of the messenger. This fact further encouraged the practice of
grooming the sons of noblemen and gentlemen to positions of shipboard power.
Captains
Beyond the general responsibilities outlined in the Regulations and Instructions
and the legal protocol stated in the “Articles of War,” the functional duties and authority
of midshipmen depended on the preferences of individual captains. In practical terms,
expectations for the social and professional behaviour of quarterdeck boys rested almost
entirely with a commander. Even as captains began to lose their monopoly on the
selection of young gentlemen during the early stages of the French Revolutionary Wars,
they retained practical jurisdiction over the boys in their charge. Decisions to pardon or
punish, mentor or neglect, send a boy into deadly danger or keep him in relative safety
below decks, all came down to the management style of individual captains. Peter Cullen
Esq., surgeon’s mate aboard the frigate Squirrel, commented on the effectiveness of
Captain Drury’s husbandry, “he was an excellent man for bringing up young gentlemen –
the midshipmen, for to be eminent officers in His Majesty’s Navy, and which many of
them turned out to be.”15
Management style was often shaped by other factors including the ship’s rating
which dictated the number of midshipmen aboard and the number of officers available to
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supervise them, the vessel’s commission and cruising orders, and the age and competency
of the boys themselves. As such, generalizations on the types of duties and the extent of
authority granted young gentlemen are difficult to draw and contradictions abound.
At fifteen John Harvey Boteler found himself second-in-command of a raiding
party sent to destroy a flotilla of gunboats. His fellow officer was a daring boy, several
years his junior, named Billy “Hell Flames” Lucas. Yet on other days, Boteler described
his mates indulging in games of leap-frog, childish practical jokes, and frivolous pursuits,
which, in the case of a young midshipman who fell and drowned while trying to catch a
bird, could prove deadly.16 Dillon too, described the strange dichotomy of boys growing
up aboard men-of-war. As a stunted and scrawny thirteen year-old midshipman, Dillon
was forced to defend his ship’s watering boat from the predations of a group of Indiamen
bent on ransacking his stores. Dillon followed the account of this adventure with a
description of his messmates, including a fellow of the same age who still sucked his
thumb.17 Captains’ standards for acceptable behaviour varied as widely as their methods
of exacting complicity. Captain Edward Riou of the Amazon threatened dismissal from
the service for young gentlemen who were idle or not continually “acquiring some useful
information,”18 while the force of Collingwood’s personality kept subordinates in check:
“. . . a look of displeasure from him was as bad as a dozen at the gangway from another
man.”19
While the practice of putting boys to work at an early age was common enough in
eighteenth-century England, the uniqueness of a career as a naval officer, which required
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a rare combination of professional skill, book-learning, and understanding of human
nature, appeared to place the pre-pubescent boy at a distinct disadvantage. Were it not for
two factors – the belief that the only possible way to acclimatize to a naval life was to
begin young and the high priority ascribed by the government to training naval officers as
the front line of England’s defenses – the task might have been left to older recruits who
no longer felt the need to shoot marbles on the poop deck in their spare time.20
Collingwood recognized the flaws in the system: “The fact is, that these boys are made
Lieutenants too soon, and before their heads can bear their good fortune. It seems so easy
to them that they do not set that value on their stations which they ought.”21 Captains
mitigated the problems caused by under-ripe, over-empowered juniors by weighing two
factors in the authority equation – the capabilities of the individual and the tolerance of
the ship’s company.
While ability, initiative, and maturity counted for much in terms of the duties
entrusted to young gentlemen, captains supported a boy’s authority as a natural right of
those who walked the quarterdeck. In doing so they reaffirmed their own privileges of
command. According to an early biographer, Collingwood “used to tell the ship’s
company that he was determined that the youngest midshipman should be obeyed as
implicitly as himself, and that he should punish with great severity any instance to the
contrary.”22 Collingwood also understood the importance of teaching young officers to
cope with the pressures of managing potentially explosive human-resource situations:
When a mid. made a complaint [against a seaman], he [Collingwood] would order
the man for punishment the next day; and in the interval, calling the boy down to
20

Rodger, Command, p. 508.
Cuthbert Collingwood to Lord Howick, November 7, 1806, in Newnham Collingwood, Correspondence,
Vol. I, p. 343.
22
Newnham Collingwood, Correspondence, Vol. I, p.70.
21

62

him, would say, “In all probability the fault was yours; but whether or not, I am
sure it would go to your heart to see a man old enough to be your father disgraced
and punished on your account; and it will therefore give me a good opinion of
your disposition, if, when he is brought out, you ask for his pardon.” When this
recommendation acting as it did like an order, was complied with, and the lad
interceded for the prisoner, Captain Collingwood would make great apparent
difficulty in yielding, but at length would say, “This young gentlemen has pleaded
so humanely for you, that in hope you will feel a due gratitude to him for his
benevolence, I will for this time, overlook your offence.23
The careful management of a boy’s authority, taking into account the qualities of the
individual, the morale of the ship’s people, and the need to support the unquestioned
authority of the quarterdeck, was essential in maintaining a man-of-war’s social balance
and operational effectiveness.
Captains could also set the tone for interactions between the lower deck and
quarterdeck by determining how and when the line of separation was upheld.
Quarterdeck boys and midshipmen, as hybrids of both ratings and officers, embodied the
dividing line and all its ambiguities. Article 22 of the “Articles of War” promised death to
any man who struck or threatened to strike a superior officer. In practice, this law
extended even to touching a superior. Dillon, however, recorded that as a ten year-old
captain’s servant aboard the seventy-four gun Saturn: “. . . one or two of the seamen
devoted themselves to me, and would often carry me in their arms to explain several parts
of the ship in answer to my inquiries.”24 No sailor who valued life would have dared take
such liberties, even with a pint-sized officer, unless his captain explicitly authorized such
behaviour. The Saturn’s Captain Linzee clearly saw some benefit in the interaction of
gentlemanly youngsters and “sea daddies,” even when they came from the lower deck.
James Gardner, too, recounted the story of Mr. Stack, a lower-deck man rated
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midshipman to keep the boys in order “as the father of our mess.” Stack had “an ugly
way of showing his kindness. When in good temper (which was seldom) he would say
‘My son,’ when he addressed any of us; but generally [it was], ‘I’ll split your ear’.”25 It is
unlikely that such behavior would have been attempted, let alone tolerated, without a
captain’s consent.
The authority transferred to quarterdeck boys by captains could therefore work in
either direction, to separate young officers from the ship’s company or to assimilate them
when appropriate. A captain’s ability to strike the right balance often determined the
success of his junior officer corps and the smooth operation of his ship.
The Lower Deck
More important perhaps than any source of authority from above, was that
enabled by those below. According to the fundamental principles of old-order stability –
paternalism and deference – authority could be upheld only by “widespread tacit and
explicit support.”26 The ability of midshipmen to carry out their duties rested equally on
this principle. Young gentlemen as captain’s protégés represented the elite of shipboard
society; their orders echoed the captain’s and therefore required equal attention. Seamen
relied on the knowledge and expertise of those above, not only for their day to day safety
in working the ship and steering a course, but for wartime decisions that would ensure the
safety of their ship and their nation. On the opposite side of the relationship, the men
were just as vital. Without the labor of hundreds of mariners, such complex war machines
could not function. In this way, the strange dynamics of young and inexperienced boys
commanding veteran able seamen was a prime example of the ancient social contract at
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work – a contract based on mutual need. A midshipman’s fair and respectful treatment of
those “before the mast” fulfilled the unspoken agreement inherent in a society run on
principles of patrician domination. Violation of this “contract” led not only to problems
of morale but to a breakdown of the only immediate support mechanism available to
officers – that of their men. William Robinson a.k.a. Jack Nastyface recounted the
consequences of breaking this implicit bond. He described one rather sadistic twelve
year-old midshipman:
whose sole delight was to insult the feelings of the seamen and furnish pretexts to
get them punished . . . I have often seen him get on the carriage of a gun, call a
man to him, and kick him about the thighs and body, and with his fist would beat
him about the head, and these, although prime seamen, at the same time dared not
murmur.
Retribution came with a savage engagement during which no mariner thought to look out
for the boy. “. . . [H]e was killed on the quarter-deck by a grape-shot, his body greatly
mutilated, his entrails being driven and scattered against the larboard side. . . .” Cheers
accompanied news of the boy’s demise and, as Robinson noted, “his death was hailed as
the triumph over an enemy.”27 This graphic depiction emphasized the fact that leadership
existed and was maintained by the approval and support of those below. It also spoke to
the consequences of unfulfilled paternalistic duties at the command level.
The ultimate expression of a breakdown in naval order came with the 1797
mutinies. The uprising represented a labor strike in support of a pay raise (seamen’s
wages had not increased since 1652), better quality victuals, improved conditions for the
wounded, and amendments to the bounty system of recruitment which unfairly rewarded
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those who avoided volunteering for as long as possible.28 The Spithead mutiny
demonstrated that while lower-deck men displayed an extraordinary tolerance for neglect
and ill-treatment, such virtues had their limit.
H. G. Thursfield suggested other causal factors related directly to the
disintegration of the paternalistic code.29 Three years earlier in 1794, a mutiny took place
aboard Captain Thomas Troubridge’s Culloden, initiated by the crew’s belief in the
unseaworthiness of their ship. Captain Thomas Pakenham quelled the uprising by
promising, it was later rumored, that the mutineers would receive his protection and a full
pardon for their actions. Five mutineers were, in fact, hanged, destroying the trust which
formed an integral part of the naval relationship: “. . . after this no seaman would believe
an officer’s word of honour.”30 The memory of this incident fuelled a belligerence in the
Spithead mutineers, who calmly stated their ultimate loyalty to king and country and dug
in their heels on the issues at hand.
The orderly and respectful conduct of the Spithead mutineers did, however, rouse
the sympathies of Lord Bridport and the First Lord, Earl Spencer and brought
concessions on most of the demands raised. Such rational behaviour also elicited a royal
pardon which, after two weeks of negotiation, brought the Portsmouth mutiny to a
peaceful end. In light of the volatile political climate circulating in England at the time,
stirred by French Jacobins and United Irishmen, the success of a fleet-wide mutiny
roused the passions of mariners and the fears of officers. Many captains now trod lightly
on the quarterdeck, shy of exacting punishments for even the most unequivocal offences.
Others, like St. Vincent, reacted with unflinching severity to any whisper of discord. The
28
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result was a cleavage at the highest levels of naval operations, and a separation of the old
and new philosophies of command and management of shipboard social hierarchies.
Conservatives like Collingwood upheld the paternalistic code, believing that the best
service he could do a body of men was to keep them well ordered and free of the need for
independent thought on wider political and social matters. “It has always been a maxim
with me,” wrote Collingwood, “to engage and occupy my men, and to take such care for
them that they should have nothing to think of for themselves, beyond the current
business of the day.”31 Such calm sentiments reflected none of St. Vincent’s iron-fisted
reactionary discipline. Collingwood was famous for his disdain of corporal punishment
and his demand for the respectful treatment of seamen, instructing young gentlemen that
“if you do not know a man’s name call him ‘sailor’, and not ‘you-sir’ and other such
appellations; they are offensive and improper.”32 Collingwood’s respect for the average
mariner nonetheless existed within the old seigneurial system, governed as it was by
concepts of paternalism and deference. Yet, the mutinies managed to inspire subtle
changes in the paternalistic system.
By 1803 the storm created by the French terror, and Wolf Tone was all but spent
although Rodger sees evidence of “a long-term evolution in attitudes to naval discipline
. . . matters which had been taken for granted before were now the subject of much
thought and comment, by both officers and ratings.” 33 Most significant was the mariner’s
eagerness to demand that officers treat him with respect. New attitudes that gained
popularity with more liberal captains promoted the British tar as a rational, professional,
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mature creature, possessed of certain inalienable rights. By 1811 Captain Anselm
Griffiths noted a transformation in the men serving aboard British men-of-war: “Seamen
are nowadays a thinking set of people and a large portion of them possess no
inconsiderable share of common sense, the most useful sense after all.” With respect to
an officer’s authority he offered a thinly-veiled warning:
[Seamen] are capable certainly of judging when they are well treated, whether
those in authority over them exercise it with mildness and due attention to their
comforts, and it is natural to suppose they sit lighter under the yoke of a man who
they see knows and does his own duty. 34
While Griffiths’ opinions might be interpreted as heralding a new naval order, his
characterization of seamen as intelligent, skilled professionals also served another
purpose, one that undermined notions of a fundamental social reform. Griffiths used such
observations to demand more of those who walked the quarterdeck, both in terms of their
respectful and gentlemanly treatment of inferiors and their professionalism. His criticism
of officers’ conduct sought to push the standards of command higher, thereby widening
the gap between quarterdeck and lower deck. Just as the principle of rule by consent
remained firmly at the root of all naval authority, the need for officers to distance
themselves from the men through genteel conduct, superior knowledge, and
unquestionable skill reinforced the old paradigm and further justified the natural
dominance of the patrician classes. The opening lines of Griffiths’ opus on the state of the
Royal Navy in the new century summarized his position on the governance of a ship’s
people and the distinction between the ranks: “. . . I am not only a strenuous advocate for
correct discipline, but a decided enemy to the littleness of character known by the
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appellation of courting popularity.”35 A tightly ordered hierarchy remained central to
Griffiths’ sense of “modern” command, while a heightened sense of formality in
shipboard relationships supported notions of a continuing ancien régime. As Rodger
notes, “the senior officers of a generation before had been accustomed to a sort of rough
intimacy with their men which had disappeared by the end of the century. . . .”36 In this
context, Griffiths’ theories can be seen less in terms of liberal innovation and more as a
solution to the problem of changing social dynamics aboard men-of-war. His
understanding of the modern seaman also suggested a process by which officers could,
and should, distance themselves from a ship’s company.
Young William Dillon provided evidence that even the “new breed” seaman
supported notions of the natural superiority of noblemen and gentlemen. Dillon recalled
an experience during his time as a midshipman in which seamen carried him and his
comrades across mud flats on their backs to reach a stranded tender. He also convinced
the men to carry out two French civilian prisoners who were “almost entitled to the name
of gentlemen.” As Lewis notes, “[Dillon] evidently took it for granted that he and his
messmates would avoid muddy feet by being carried . . . and they were not
disappointed.” Gentility apparently also “transcended nationality, and even war,” and
despite the initial protestations of the crew at having to render service to their enemies,
the fact that the men complied “only seems to show that, at heart, they also attached a
great importance to the idea of gentility.” Dillon’s example revealed little development
towards a more democratic system of command. Lewis notes that, “. . . any regret that his
subordinate’s feet should become muddy while his remained clean” were non existent,
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“. . . the much more modern conception of sharing discomfort with his men – simply did
not enter his head at all.”37
By the time of the Great Wars, acceptance of a midshipman by a company of
mariners often required a measure of gentility, whether by title, wealth, education or at
the very least, appearance. Seamen were wary of midshipmen who had “come in through
the hawse-hole,”38 as young men who had overstepped their bounds. Jealousies combined
with a sense of lower-deck solidarity in the ultimate expression of an old-order mentality.
A Mariner of England’s William Richardson hinted at his preference for a tightly ordered
shipboard society: “in all my experience at sea I have found seamen grateful for good
usage, and yet they like to see subordination kept up as they know the duty could not be
carried on without it.”39 As late as 1847, Seaman John Bechervaise wrote of his faith in
professionalism and a strict hierarchy of naval order:
I would always choose a ship in which every duty was attended to strictly, in
preference to one in which a man did almost as he liked. Indeed, I’ve frequently
heard old seamen say (when two ships were in commission and both wanting
hands), “I’ll go with Captain _____: he’s a taut one, but he is Captain of his own
ship.”40
The demand for greater standards of professionalism amongst quarterdeck boys
addressed another potential source of authority from the lower deck. Earning the respect
of a crew through displays of courage, intelligence, professional skill, and/or effective
leadership offered one of the surest roads to success and promotion. In this formula,
Rodger notes the social paradox underlying the naval hierarchy. Traditionally,
“gentlemen were the natural leaders of society because of who they were, not what they
37
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had learned.” But naval authority also required a high level of professional skill. Young
gentlemen “who had been taught common skills like knotting and splicing by common
seamen, were unusual creatures in eighteenth-century society.”41 Within naval culture,
however, proficiency was expected of junior officers regardless of their social pedigree as
it determined the extent of practical authority accorded a young gentleman by the
mariners in his charge. Authority as the sum of natural rights and professional merit
characterized the Royal Navy’s command structure throughout the Great Wars and
reflected the basis of “a new underlying ideal, one in which duty was beginning to
infiltrate the concept of honour.”42 In this is evidence of Clark’s concept of social
flexibility and the ability of patrician society to absorb changes in order to reinforce its
dominance. The more conscientious attitudes adopted by officers and midshipmen
towards their inferiors in the early years of the nineteenth century reaffirmed the old
standards of paternal duty, from which young gentlemen reaped the rewards of
heightened loyalty and respect from the lower deck.
The Rouge’s March
Amendments to the system of naval punishment also reflected more enlightened
approaches to authority and discipline. The Regulations and Instructions of 1806
abolished the “gauntlet,” a punishment that required a ship’s company to whip an
offender with knotted ropes as he walked past each man in succession. In 1809 the
Admiralty forbade “starting,” the practice of striking crewmen for minor offences or to
speed their work. Although this particular punishment continued in some ships, the
official position on corporal brutality spoke volumes to the changing dynamics of
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shipboard life. Samples of court martial records from the Seven Years War through the
French Revolutionary Wars show that “the men particularly resented being struck by
midshipmen,”43 as starting and beating were common complaints brought against young
gentlemen and petty officers. Seaman William Russell was absolved of further
punishment for a charge of mutiny against Midshipman Henry Rycraft, “in consideration
of the Blows he received from the Petty Officer.”44 Rycraft had, in fact, beaten the
seaman repeatedly about the head and face causing him to fall and injure himself further.
In 1761 Seaman Thomas Smith accused Midshipman Ireland of the Hampton Court of
verbally abusing him and striking him with a rattan, while Acting Lieutenant John Guy
found himself dismissed from the service in 1792 for “cruel, unofficerlike conduct
towards Samuel Brown, seaman. . . .”45
While these examples were representative of a substantial number of violent
demonstrations of a young gentleman’s authority they also suggested that, in some cases
at least, its abuse would not be tolerated. From the commencement of the French
Revolutionary Wars, and particularly after 1797, the court martial records revealed
significantly fewer incidences of quarterdeck boys inflicting cruelty and violence upon a
ship’s people and far more cases of their insolence, disobedience, and brutality towards
superior officers. Of the fifty recorded courts martial of midshipmen and acting
lieutenants from July 1797 through 1815, nearly 40 percent deal with varying levels of
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verbal or physical abuse towards superior officers,46 by far the largest single category of
charges recorded.
The shift appeared to coincide not only with the aftermath of mutiny but also
paralleled the steady increase in the appearance of Honorables and the sons of highranking gentlemen aboard His Majesty’s ships. This correlation hinted at the disdain
noble and gentlemanly petty officers appear to have held for their less exalted superiors,
suggesting that St. Vincent’s lament for the “decay of subordination”47 caused by the
influx of young blue-bloods, indeed, had substance.
The Breakdown of Subordination
The popularity and prestige of a naval career for aristocratic and well-connected
young gentlemen further obscured the quarterdeck boy’s status which suspended him
somewhere between the level of a low-grade warrant officer and commissioned rank. The
infiltration of social rank into the once-separate world of service rank further muddied the
waters of naval authority. The court martial of Midshipman Owen B. Williams, a
gentleman’s son who led a pack of other “well-born” midshipmen in a night attack on the
master of HMS Triumph as the latter slept ashore, presented a case of youthful
conceptions of social precedence exercising authority over naval rank. As an old-school
warrant officer with no pretension to gentility, the Triumph’s master presented an
obvious target for the drunken young gentlemen. After beating the master about the head
“with his fist or a stone,” Williams opted for the ultimate degradation of rank, forcing the
older man to “walk the streets nearly naked.” The master testified that “he [Williams]
called me a damned rascal, and [said] that I was not entitled to wear a sword . . . ,”
46
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charges that confirmed Williams’ belief in the exclusivity of the rights of gentlemen. The
court however, found Williams guilty, disrating him “to serve before the mast” as a
common sailor.48
Outside the jurisdiction of Admiralty law, assaults on naval authority from the
midshipman’s berth affected even the best-run ships. Collingwood wrote to J. E. Blackett
of a fractious young gentleman who possessed both interest and family:
The conduct and behaviour of Mr. _____ has added very much to my vexation. A
few days since, upon the most trivial occasion, he broke out into such a fit of
frenzy and rage, and behaved to me in so contemptuous and extraordinary a
manner, that I desired the First Lieutenant to order him off the deck. . . . The day
following, he wrote a letter, not excusing his conduct, but rather justifying it and
requesting to be discharged into any other ship.49
Young John Boteler, too, described the degenerate behaviour of a fellow midshipman and
gentleman’s son he named “the Squire.” Significant political connections had convinced
the Squire that he was above the orders of his captain, such that when threatened with a
flogging for one of his many offences, the young gentleman obtained a pocket pistol with
which to defend his honor. Boteler persuaded the boy to give up his weapon, “convinced
[that] had the captain sent for him in the cabin that he [the Squire] would have shot
him.”50 Captain Gambier, losing his patience with a fourteen year-old Dillon exclaimed,
“. . . you are a refractory young gentleman. I see how it is. You rely on your influential
connections. Quit the Cabin directly.”51 These examples tend to confirm Nelson’s
observation that with respect to young Honorables, “. . . they will always do as they
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please. Orders are not for them – at least I never knew yet one who obeyed.”52
Lieutenants in charge of noble young gentlemen found themselves in particularly
awkward situations. Preferment to the ranks of commander and post captain depended
almost entirely on the patronage of well-connected captains, admirals, members of the
Board of Admiralty, or political notables. The possibility of damaging one or more of
these avenues to promotion by the mishandling of noble and highly-ranked quarterdeck
boys made it difficult for commissioned officers to exercise the proper authority. Aboard
the Unité in 1807, Robert Wilson recalled that even in a “ship of strict discipline,” First
Lieutenant John Wilson could not (or at least did not) enforce the mastheading of a
midshipman, Mr. McDougal, who refused to obey his orders. Rather than confining the
boy for insolence and insubordination, Lieutenant Wilson waited for the return of his
captain, who later saw to the boy’s punishment.53
William Dillon taunted his schoolmaster to strike away with his cane then
warned, “recollect that I am a gentleman, and beware of the consequence.”54 Dillon also
recalled an incident aboard the Saturn in 1791, which demonstrated the worst-possible
consequences in disciplining the sons of notables. Mr. Leonard, a young gentleman of
interest, refused his First Lieutenant’s orders to go to the masthead, considering himself
above the status of such punishments. The lieutenant then ordered a gantline rigged in
order to haul the boy aloft. Leonard was badly injured during the procedure and the
“event became known throughout the Fleet, and caused a very strong sensation among
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the Midshipmen, many of whom were of the first families in the country. Leonard was
advised by several to proceed legally against the Lieutenant.”55
Leonard did not take legal action; although wider consequences soon followed.
Bitter pamphlets circulated by Edward Moore, midshipman of HMS London and “a
gentleman of independent means,” sought to rally young Honorables throughout the fleet
at Spithead in order to avenge the injustice done Mr. Leonard. While Moore was quickly
tried, dismissed from the service, and confined to Marshalsea prison for a time, the
aborted “Midshipmen’s Mutiny,” confirmed the worst fears of those captains and senior
officers who recognized the problems inherent in the gentrification of the midshipman’s
berth. The event also provided an example of the confusion, pervasive in the Royal Navy
of the Great Wars, between social rank and naval rank.
Richard Woodman in his introduction to Lord Cochrane’s autobiography also
notes tensions operating in the other direction. “. . . [I]t is equally true to say that his
[Lord Cochrane’s] title automatically attracted a degree of prejudice and hostility from a
naval service largely officered by steady, professional, middle-class men.”56 Perhaps it
was the solidarity of the titled and influential that led Admiral Philip Patton, one of the
more democratic commentators in his field, to denounce the effects of equality amongst
notables on the quarterdeck:
That high degree of familiarity between the officers of different ranks under the
pretence of the equality of gentlemen, which may be compatible with the situation
of men composing an army, but which must undermine obedience . . . is utterly
destructive of discipline in a situation so confined as that of a ship. . . . that
familiarity among the different ranks of officers must prove the destruction of
subordination.57
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The resurgence of a patrician hegemony within the Royal Navy appeared to Patton and
many of his contemporaries as destructive to the old paradigm of naval authority.
Paradoxically, Royal Navy observers denounced the “new” trend that gave precedence to
society’s elite, while lamenting the loss of “old” naval traditions that rewarded merit and
restructured shipboard society in terms of service rank. Despite Jonathan Clark’s
suggestion that “eighteenth century Englishmen had no sense of living through such a
process of modernization . . . ,”58 Patton’s discourses revealed at least some perception of
change. The curious fact is that naval observers appear to have perceived the changes in
reverse of normal theories of social dynamics recognized by scholars like Paul Langford.
A meritocracy declining with the resurgence of aristocratic privilege confirmed change,
but in the nature of Clark’s concept of an essentially old order, absorbing conflict and
tension within a society dominated by the elite. Those who embraced naval tradition
embraced the old methods of officer recruitment from the rank and file and promotion
based on performance. Royal Navy traditionalists therefore championed a socially and
politically “radical” institution, subversive of the old-order hierarchies. The freedom of
an independent meritocracy, exemplified by the navy under Lord Sandwich throughout
the 1770s and early 80s, faded with the century as the dominant forces in English society
– the political and social elite – asserted their control and brought the service into line
with more traditional values. External factors, including politics and wealth, became the
agents of change in renegotiating the social equation within both the officer corps and
between officers and the men. The result was a resurgence of patrician hegemony that
restored an old-order system of junior-officer selection and promotion within the service.
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External Sources of Authority
Religion
As one of the two pillars in Clark’s theory of an ascendant elite in Georgian
society, religion supported the old social order with the justification of divine right. The
inseparability of religion from the laws of the land meant that Anglican values remained
dominant in English social structures despite the growing prominence of secular issues in
daily life and the challenges presented by Protestant Dissenters. The public structures and
ideological rationales of Clark’s confessional state “signifie[d] monopoly not unanimity
. . . [as] power was formally confined to Anglicans. . . .”59 Throughout the Great Wars the
“Protestant Constitution” remained firmly in place. In 1792 Samuel Heywood, a
Unitarian Dissenter and unabashed Whig, railed at the omnipotence of the Anglican
Church and its officers:
Every event in life contributes to their interests; they christen; they educate; they
marry; they church; they bury; they persuade; they frighten; they govern; and
scarce any thing is done without them. Notwithstanding all this, they roar aloud
that they cannot keep their ground.60
The social structure supported by Anglicanism drew strength from a resurgence of
evangelicalism in the last decades of the eighteenth century. As a reaction against the
atheistic radicalism of the French Revolution and the increasingly Catholic character of
Irish rebellion, conservative evangelicals assimilated the authoritarian tenets of Anglican
doctrine in their support for old-order hierarchies. Touting “national virtues” such as
“obedience, submission, orderliness, respect for authority, patience in suffering, civility,
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restraint and loyalty,”61 the case in support of Anglican ideology, with all its political and
social implications, gained momentum. Wesleyan Methodism, with its foundations in
High Tory politics, exemplified such values and spread rapidly while its more
democratically-oriented offshoots, such as Alexander Kilham’s “New Connexion”
founded in 1797 (also known as Tom Paine Methodism), saw little success in the face of
a government poised for swift action against any rumblings of liberal reform. As E. P.
Thompson suggests “it was in the counter-revolutionary years after 1795 that Methodism
made most headway amongst working people and acted most evidently as a stabilising or
regressive social force.”62
The combined forces of religion and law, which supported a traditional social
hierarchy dominated by the hereditary elite, became increasingly evident in the Royal
Navy of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. The “rigging” of church every
Sunday aboard Georgian men-of-war (when the requirements of the service allowed it)
brought this message home to mariners in sermons preached either by a commissioned
parson, a passenger cleric, or in many instances, the captain himself. At least once a
month a reading of the “Articles of War” followed church service. In such a setting
Admiralty law took on a quasi-religious quality, drilling the message of submission to
authority by right of laws, both natural and revealed, via the trappings and rhetorical style
of a religious sermon. In 1806 young Robert Wilson recalled, “. . . on board H. M. ships,
the Articles of War are ordained to be read the first Sunday in every month, which the
seamen term saying prayers.”63 In ships without chaplains or captains well motivated to
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religious instruction, a reading of the “Articles of War” might replace divine service
altogether. In the Royal Navy, the law and the church were effectively one. Clark sees the
unity of church and law as a ubiquitous feature of English society in the long eighteenth
century and one of the primary agents in the maintenance of an ancien régime.
Beyond forming the social cement that bound legal and religious doctrine, the
spiritual role of church service aboard men-of-war remained limited. The first Article of
War demanded:
All commanders, captains, and officers, in or belonging to any of His Majesty's
ships or vessels of war, shall cause the public worship of Almighty God,
according to the liturgy of the Church of England established by law, to be
solemnly, orderly and reverently performed in their respective ships; and shall
take care that prayers and preaching, by the chaplains in holy orders of the
respective ships, be performed diligently; and that the Lord's day be observed
according to law.64
The frequency of religious services, however, remained at the discretion of individual
captains and at the mercy of wind, weather, and the demands of the service. The
Reverend Edward Mangin bore no illusions as to the priority granted to ministering
aboard a ship:
Of my comrades, most of them were either too much engaged with the business of
the ship, or too confined and technical in the turn of their minds. . . . to go among
the crew, and discourse with them of religion and morality, I have already shown
not to be very practicable. . . . I accordingly felt myself most awkwardly situated
and fancied I was somewhat like a pet bear on board. I was fed, coaxed and stared
at: if in my den, forgotten; if at large, in everybody’s way; of no manner of use –
and at best endured!65
Mangin was far from delighted with shipboard life, although it appeared that his
melancholy did not stem from any ill-treatment directed at him by the ship’s company.
Upon leaving the vessel Mangin wrote of his shipmates, “I can not omit observing that
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they united in treating me and my office with respect: and in behaviour at Divine
Worship, would have set a worthy example to the most decorous congregation on
shore. . . .” The point however, remained: “. . . [to] convert a man-of-war’s crew into
Christians would be a task to which the courage of Loyola, the philanthropy of Howard
and the eloquence of St. Paul united, would prove inadequate.”66
Despite such commentary and Brian Lavery’s conclusion that “religion played
very little part in the life of the seaman,”67 the subtext of religious order underscored, at
least for those of the lower deck, the need for rigorous observance of subordination. To a
large extent, religious instruction aboard ship was more a matter of didactic style over
religious substance. Whether “church” rigged on Sundays involved a sermon on creation
or a litany on the Articles of War the message, effectively, remained the same. Holy law
prescribed an unquestioned faith in the judgment of shipboard superiors – even if those
superiors were boys, largely ignorant of seamanship and the professional requirements of
command.
By the start of the Napoleonic Wars, birth and interest had privileged many
aristocratic and gentlemanly boys to the quarterdeck. Leadership afloat, like leadership
ashore, received a vital boost from a religious dogma that preached obedience and respect
for authority both natural and ascribed, regardless of its age or professional credentials.
Politics
Midshipmen and quarterdeck boys, as embryonic gentlemen officers, drew
authority from the political forms of English society which supported governance based
on the hereditary right of society’s natural leaders. Even John Locke’s Two Treatises of
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Government did not deny the hierarchical nature of society, the patriarchal role of
government, or the influence of old-order entitlements to authority. “That all Men by
Nature are equal, I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of Equality . . . Birth may
subject some, and Alliance or Benefits others, to pay an Observance to those whom
Nature, Gratitude or other Respects may have made it due. . . .”68 Such old-order
sentiments prevailed in 1793 as Tory Prime Minister, William Pitt the Younger, after
nearly ten years at Downing Street, shed the remnants of his liberal-reformist cloak and
assumed the mantle of an arch conservative. The hammer of English Jacobinism, Pitt
suspended habeas corpus in 1794, and in 1796 instituted a series of “gagging bills”
which “represented a significant ratcheting-up of his repressive responses to
discontent.”69 As a war-time prime minister, Pitt was acutely aware of the importance of
the armed services, despite his self-professed shortcomings as a military man.
Disappointments with England’s Continental army did not, however, dampen his
enthusiasm for the navy as the dominant force in Britain’s war machine.
The strength of Pitt’s belief in the Royal Navy and concern for her welfare
resulted in the removal of his elder brother, the 2nd Earl of Chatham, from the position of
First Lord of the Admiralty in 1794. Pitt understood only too well that Chatham “lacked
the drive and intellectual grasp to run the navy at the height of a global war.”70
The appointment of the moderate “Portland” Whig, Earl Spencer, as First Lord
represented a more sound investment in the operational effectiveness of the Royal Navy
and a new focus on the naval strategy. Spencer, however, seized the opportunity to
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indulge prejudices that favored the political elite in the appointment of young gentlemen
and officers, exploiting his powers of patronage for both parliamentary and personal gain.
Accordingly, privileged boys benefited from Spencer’s methods. As a protégé and close
relation of the Lady Spencer, young Edward Fellowes “rose from midshipman to captain
in twenty months,”71 a feat of unprecedented advancement, even amongst the navy’s
most brilliant young officers. In response to the “importunities and remonstrances of
Lord Carnarvon, who made such an outcry about his son’s disappointments,” Spencer
saw to it that Midshipman Lord Charles Herbert made lieutenant at eighteen and post
captain at twenty.72 Yet, the First Lord was not oblivious to the needs of the service as a
whole. Sensible of the legitimacy of grievances aired by the Spithead mutineers, Spencer
was instrumental in convincing Pitt to yield to their demands.73 The Nore uprising,
however, with its subversive political agenda, elicited a far less conciliatory response
from either the First Lord or the Prime Minister. As William Hague notes, Pitt, “the
champion of enlightened reform had now become the chief agent of repression.”74
Ironically, the repression of political dissent within the Royal Navy was applied
with greater gusto by the Addington administration’s choice of First Lord. Despite his
Foxite Whig allegiances, the Earl St. Vincent escalated attacks on corruption in the
dockyards, venality among Navy Board members, and Jacobinism within the service to
the level of witch-hunts. The public face of St. Vincent’s policies also appeared to turn
the tables on traditional aristocratic influence by insisting that places for all existing
officers must be found before other promotions would take place. Such democratic
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principles also extended to the appointment and promotion of young gentlemen. The
Times commented on St. Vincent’s plan, noting that “the system is undoubtedly just and
highly honourable to him, but if the noble Lord can pursue such a rigorous and impartial
line of conduct for a continuance, it will be more than his predecessors have been able to
accomplish.”75 In practice, such noble ideals were beyond St. Vincent too. His actions
over the following years demonstrated much partisan handling of appointments across the
spectrum of naval command, from midshipmen to post captains. St. Vincent bragged on
the impartiality he demonstrated towards his own nephew who, despite “uncommon
merit,” he “refused to promote [even] at the request of four princes of the blood.” The
First Lord did, in fact, promote the boy, ensuring him a post captaincy at age nineteen.76
Lord Thomas Cochrane, on the other hand, was a dyed-in-the-wool Tory and high
on St. Vincent’s black list. Even Cochrane’s celebrated action against a Spanish xebec
frigate, far superior in guns and men to his own four-pounder brig, could not gain his step
to post captain. Cochrane quoted an early biographer of St. Vincent in his own memoirs:
“Lord St Vincent was so much pressed on the subject of Lord Cochrane’s promotion for
taking the Gamo, that it became almost a point of etiquette with the earl not to make him
a captain.” Cochrane was certainly not short on powerful interest, though in this case, it
did little good. “An illustrious person is reported to have said, ‘My Lord, we must make
Lord Cochrane “post”’; to which Lord St Vincent replied, ‘The First Lord of the
Admiralty knows no must’.”77 Even when St. Vincent’s moral barometer operated well,
such political biases exemplified the fact that Admiralty favor functioned almost
exclusively within the highest ranks of society. Patronage, interest, and political favor
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determined opportunities for a naval career, leaving the sons of the unconnected to rely
on little more than luck in their struggle for recognition and promotion.
Prime Minister Addington’s search for political legitimacy, via the appointment
of a celebrated naval hero like St. Vincent as First Lord, backfired disastrously, leaving
the Royal Navy decimated by 1803. St. Vincent “had wrecked morale and efficiency,
reduced the [dock]yard’s workforce by a fifth and badly damaged their capacity to
recruit.” The results were visible in the miserable state of the fleet by the
recommencement of war in 1803. In 1797, 108 ships of the line and 293 frigates and
smaller vessels were in active service, 82 percent of the total fleet. By 1805 the
proportion of operational vessels had fallen to 40 percent with only 83 ships of the line in
commission and “an acute shortage of frigates and men to man them.”78 The downsizing
translated into even narrower opportunities for quarterdeck boys and an even greater
concentration of Honorable young gentlemen within the fleet.79
The return of Pitt as Prime Minister in 1804, coupled with the appointment of
Henry Dundas, now Lord Melville, as First Lord ushered in a new era of rapid
mobilization and naval expansion. Melville’s impeachment for corruption less than a year
later did little to halt the growth of the Royal Navy. The efforts of his successor, Charles
Middleton, Lord Barham, along with years of successful battles and prize captures,
helped to build the navy’s largest fleet ever by 1810, with a total of 152 ships of the line
and 183 cruisers.80 The expanded fleet did not, however, open opportunities for the
multitudes of deserving young gentlemen. Decades of largely unregulated entry had
produced a glut of quarterdeck boys while the continued popularity of a naval career for
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the sons of the social and political elite only heightened competition for limited positions.
The old system of interest and patronage continued and, indeed, intensified. After Pitt’s
death, a series of short-lived governments, all Tory except for Grenville’s facetiously
named “Ministry of the Talents,” sought to maintain the old social structures of the nation
and the navy alike, pursing policies that generally conformed to Pitt’s maxim of
improvement instead of innovation – “redesign rather than revolution.”81
Lord Collingwood, a representative of the old guard, believed in the effectiveness
of old-order paternalism as a means of maintaining naval discipline. As naval equivalents
of the ruling class, he believed that officers were responsible for shielding mariners from
disruptive influences, particularly those stirred by political radicals. The mutinies of
1797, which hinted at the political potential of more than one hundred thousand82 lowerdeck men, emphasized the need for more ardent paternalistic control. Many saw the
devastating potential of a rebellious political solidarity among the sailors of England.
Commentators, both Tory and Whig, sought to explain the 1797 uprisings as the work of
Dissenting religious sects; corresponding societies; and/or political subversives such as
Foxite Whigs, Jacobins, and Irish rebels. Despite the lack of evidence connecting any of
these groups to the mutinies,83 the government, naval authorities, newspapers, and
conservative magazines laid blame on the nearest manifestations of political, social, or
religious heterodoxy. The ugly truth, which many refused to accept, was that honest tars,
the simple salts of the Royal Navy, had conceived of mutiny on their own without
ingesting any of the radical poisons of the day.
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While this in itself suggested some form of communal change in the character of
British sailors, Clark’s model couches an explanation for this change in terms of the
breakdown of paternalistic duty. Admiralty neglect for the welfare of its seamen
constituted a forfeiture of the utilitarian contract between those who commanded and
those who obeyed. The Royal Navy of the 1790s had, as a paternal institution, failed to
fulfill its basic promise to be useful to those under its authority – to feed, clothe, pay, and
administer health care to its mariners. Yet, the protests that erupted into the Spithead and
Yarmouth mutinies quietly dissolved as sailors’ demands were met. From the lower-deck
point of view, Admiralty concessions restored the utility of the relationship and
resurrected a functional paternalistic system. The imbalance within the naval relationship
was corrected, but within the framework of the old order.
According to Lieutenant William Hotham, the conduct of the mutineers exhibited
a “marked civility and deference.” Of the delegates he insisted, “[they] are not to be
understood as ringleaders of a mutinous assembly, but as men appointed by the majority
of each ship’s company, in order to prevent confusion and obtain as speedy a regularity
of affairs as possible.”84 In this way, Hotham spoke to the apologetic quality of the
Yarmouth mutiny despite the legitimacy of its grievances. The Great Mutinies did little to
further causes such as “the rights of man,” the ascendancy of the individual, or freedom
of thought or action within the service. The Royal Navy remained an hierarchical
oligarchy based on unquestioned obedience to superiors, backed up by repressive
political policies that meted out capital punishment as a solution to the slightest forms of
ideological dissent. In short, it mirrored precisely the characteristics of Pitt’s political
state.
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While improvements occurred in the conditions under which the men lived and
worked, and approaches to discipline softened in the years after the mutinies, the basic
structure of shipboard society remained intact, sustained equally from below as from
above. In Clark’s model, these changes and fluctuations occurred within the framework
of the “dynastic idiom.”85 Challenges to the older order appeared frequently in lateeighteenth century England, yet social and governmental leadership remained in the
hands of the elite by way of a combination of factors including:
appreciation for the advantages derived from [aristocratic government] . . .
coercion . . . habits and customs . . . [which] men appeared to obey not for the true
reason that they helped maintain social order, but for reasons which often seemed
entirely fanciful, or for no reason at all.86
Such characteristics are equally applicable to the structure of authority in the
Royal Navy. The power granted to young gentlemen originated from the same sources
that determined political and social hierarchies, both of which equally reflected the
continued dominance of the patrician classes. The Royal Navy of the Napoleonic Wars,
like the society it protected, remained a patriarchal, “confessional state dominated by
providential status . . . [and] structured vertically rather than horizontally . . . [It was] a
society fixated on the social theory of its elite. . . .”87
Education
Education, or the lack of it, presented one of the most immovable barriers
between quarterdeck and lower deck throughout the long eighteenth century. Despite the
institution of philanthropic schools for the poor throughout major urban centers by the
1780s, the practical availability of schooling for the masses lay many decades in the
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future. Public schools like Westminster, Eton, Harrow, and Rugby catered to the wealthy
upper-classes and generally provided boys with classical humanist educations designed to
prepare them for life as a gentleman. Even for those able to afford public schools,
practical naval skills such as mathematics and navigation often required specialist
instruction. The poor reputation of the Royal Naval Academy/College during the Great
Wars suggested similar shortcomings in the practical instruction of future officers. The
making of a “man of science,” as Peter Cullen suggested all potential commanders must
be, separated even very young officers from the men of the lower deck:
Mathematics, Astronomy, Navigation, Gunnery, etc. are sciences which the
officer must know or he cannot be an officer, the common seaman needs not –
and learns not. This is the grand basis of Naval Discipline, and navies cannot exist
without it. To the landsman this appears slavery, but it is not; it is ignorance
submitting to knowledge, and is true wisdom and discretion.
According to Cullen, education provided the first foundations of old-order paternalism:
“. . . a seaman looks up to his officer, as a son to his father, whom he knows to be more
wise, more experienced, and more skilful than he can possibly be, because he is
scientifically taught.”88 When applied to the relationship between a twenty-year lowerdeck veteran and a fourteen year-old midshipmen, Cullen’s opinion appeared distinctly
colored by his faith in the old social system. Written in 1800, Cullen’s journal mirrored
widely-held beliefs on the educational state of naval command and the importance of
maintaining a safe level of ignorance among its seamen.
For the average tar, the possibility of attaining even a rudimentary education
remained slim. Although literacy in England rose substantially in the second half of the
eighteenth century, the lot of the common sailor, separated from the land for years on
end, set him apart from wider social developments. Often raised at sea, Georgian
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mariners seldom gained access to the quantity or quality of education they might be
exposed to ashore. Thursfield notes the exceptions to this rule in his introduction to
“Letters from the Lower Deck.” The quality of both the prose and the hand in the samples
published are “noteworthy as illustrating the high standard of literacy of men serving on
the lower deck at the end of the 18th century. . . . ” Yet, Thursfield also warns, “. . . it
would perhaps be unwise to conclude that the standard indicated . . . was general; for
these particular letters have no doubt survived because they were so well written.”89
Assistance from educated press men, volunteers, bounty, and quota men oftentimes
presented the best educational opportunities for life-long mariners.
Such institutionalized illiteracy reflected old attitudes towards educating the poor,
which some suggested “would be prejudicial to their morals and happiness; it would
teach them to despise their lot in life . . . [and] render them fractious and refractory.”90
The gulf sustained by such beliefs only reinforced the authority of any officer, petty or
otherwise, who could read and add well enough calculate a ship’s position. Other social
commentators supported the education of the lower orders not to close the gap but to
keep them firmly in their place: “It is through education that the poor become acquainted
with the duties they owe to society.”91 Even Paul Langford notes, “. . . there was a very
deep need, perhaps reinforced by the very instability of commercial society, to stress the
divine requirement and political desirability of social subordination.”92 Such a sentiment
was fully realized in the naval social order and facilitated through selective education.
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The counter to such arguments was no less vocal and came from an equally
distinguished camp. Captain Sir Alexander Ball argued that “. . . the education of the
lower classes was of the utmost consequence to the permanent security of the empire,
even for the sake of our navy.”93 Admiral Patton agreed that the future of the navy lay in
the hands of its seamen, though he stopped short of prescribing a system for educating the
men above and beyond their station.
Others saw the argument as moot. Roy Porter notes that education, whether for
the high orders or the low, only “tended to reinforce existing social, cultural and gender
distinctions rather than break them down and make new ones.”94 For the Royal Navy, the
educational gulf dividing quarterdeck and lower deck provided strong evidence for this
type of reinforcement of traditional social hierarchies. The ability of young gentlemen to
read and write, navigate, and formulate tactics reflected a widening social gap within the
Royal Navy, one which used education to legitimize authority and promote a more
socially homogeneous midshipman’s berth.
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CONCLUSION
Samuel Leech was a lad of thirteen when Captain Lord William Fitzroy accepted
him as a lower-deck boy aboard HMS Macedonian. It was a painful experience that
Leech recorded two decades years later in a narrative colored by the evangelical reformist
language of the late 1830s. Leech recalled the sadistic proclivities of his captain which
also reflected in the bullying of the petty officers:
I felt the insults and tyranny of the midshipmen. These little minions of power
ordered and drove me round like a dog, nor did I or the other boys dare interpose
a word. They were officers; their word was our law, and woe betide the rebellious
boy that dared refuse implicit obedience.95
Even in 1810, at a time when social reform in terms of more humane treatment for
seamen was well established, it appeared that some old habits of command died hard.
This was particularly evident when the subject of a young gentleman’s cruelty was a
mere boy of lowly rank with no connections to protect him. The hostility exhibited by
young gentlemen towards boys of the lower deck might have reflected some frustration
over limitations placed on a young gentleman’s authority. It may also have reflected
growing frustration with the state of advancement and promotion in the Royal Navy of
the late-Napoleonic Wars.
A glut of officers in the service after 1793 raised the problem of unemployment
and professional immobility. As early as 1797, the Earl Spencer recognized “a crisis in
the naval career structure” as the number of officers grew faster than the number of ships
able to accommodate them.96 The restrictions limiting the number of young gentlemen
introduced into the service by individual captains had only ever been loosely enforced.
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The Navy Board’s control of the examination for lieutenant, which operated
independently of the Admiralty, placed no limitations on the number of quarterdeck boys
it passed. The combined result was a bottleneck of promotion in the early years of the
new century. As no system of decoration existed to reward the conduct of exceptional
junior officers, promotion remained the only means of acknowledging merit. In 1804 the
Admiralty introduced the term “sub-lieutenant” as a sop to the multitudes of passed
midshipmen who could not obtain a lieutenant’s commission due to the lack of openings
aboard His Majesty’s ships. These young men often served ignominious duty aboard
lesser commands with gunboats and inshore patrols. As Rodger notes, “. . . unfortunately
[sub-lieutenant] was not a rank and conferred no useful status; rather the reverse, since
gunbrig lieutenants had a bad reputation.”97
Animosity towards young Honorables and boys with significant political and
social interest escalated as competition for promotion and placement grew fierce. Lord St.
Vincent’s protest to George III that “at present the Navy is so overrun by the younger
branches of the nobility, and the sons of Members of Parliament, and they swallow up all
the patronage . . . ,”98 indicated awareness of the problem at the highest levels of English
society.
In the case of Lord Fitzroy’s appointment to Macedonian in the summer of 1810,
the point was illustrated only too well. Just a few months earlier, Captain John Clavell, an
officer with a distinguished career and a protégé of Collingwood’s since Trafalgar, had
begged his Admiral for assistance in finding a ship. To Clavell’s pleas for relief from
half-pay, Collingwood responded:
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I am very sorry that you have so little prospect of getting employed at sea;
because I am sure that there is no officer who takes the service more to heart, or
would do it more justice than you would. I have so little influence at the
Admiralty, that I have no reason to suppose anything which I could say would
avail you. Lord Mulgrave [First Lord in 1809] knows my opinion of you, and the
confidence I have in you; but the truth is, that he is so pressed by persons having
parliamentary influence, that he cannot find himself at liberty to select those
whose nautical skill and gallantry would otherwise present them as proper men
for the service. A hole or two in the skin will not weigh against a vote in
Parliament, and my influence is very light at present.99
So much for the prospects of the unconnected – and for the future of the Royal Navy.
Brilliance, daring, and valor had delivered Britain her sovereignty of the seas, yet the
system of advancement based on merit faced serious threats from the forces of social and
political rank. The advantage wielded by the American Navy during the War of 1812,
stemmed from undeniable technical innovations and the vastly superior firepower of her
“super frigates.” Yet the Royal Navy’s defeat in the conflict was absolute and must, at
least in some part, be seen as a function of her failings at the command level.
It is significant however, that the service was able to rebound from its defeat in
America to regain its status as the most powerful and successful navy in the world for the
next century. The diplomatic weeding of unsuitable officers via promotion to land-based
positions, whereby disgrace could be softened with a step up in both rank and pay,
provided the most elegant solution for both the Admiralty and its well-born wash outs.
Fitzroy’s situation exemplified the process which, despite his disgrace, allowed the
wheels of promotion to carry him inexorably towards the pinnacle of the naval
profession. Yet in matters of officer entry, opportunities grew increasingly narrow.
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Admiralty control over the appointment of young gentlemen as future officers
escalated in the post-war years, peaking in 1830, when the Lords Commissioners
assumed temporary but complete control over the nomination of officer volunteers.
Michael Lewis’ data reveals that “of the 154 officers who entered the Navy after the war
and had reached post-captain by 1849, only twenty-three were not the sons or grandsons
of naval officers, peers, members of Parliament, baronets, landed gentlemen, army
officers, bishops, deans or royalty.”100 By 1858-59, 57 percent of the volunteers
nominated as potential officers did so with the backing of “peers, members of Parliament,
baronets or knights of [Prime Minister Derby’s] party. . . .” Political interest backed by
wealth became the essential prerequisite for a naval career such that “even the most
distinguished naval families sometimes had great difficulty in obtaining nominations
without political influence.”101 The trend that surfaced during the French Revolutionary
Wars, one that led away from the naval meritocracy of mid-century towards a service
dominated by social rank, economic status, education, and political connections, became
institutionalized in the years after 1815. The qualities of an ancien régime that inspired
Jeremy Bentham to denounce “. . . cold, selfish, priest-ridden, lawyer-ridden, lord-ridden,
squire-ridden, soldier-ridden England,”102 were also reflected in the increasingly
centralized old-order organization of Royal Naval command.
As the separation between quarterdeck boys and the men of the lower deck
widened so too the equations of authority changed. The essential element of Jonathan
Clark’s thesis that renders it so applicable to the Royal Navy of the Great Wars is its
acceptance of change and fluctuation within a traditional social framework. The mutinies
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of 1797 changed the way officers looked at the men who served under them and
eventually forced a reconsideration of disciplinary measures. This in turn, altered the
terms of the relationship between quarterdeck and lower deck, forcing the two even
further apart by means of social polarization.
The concept of patrician hegemony accurately characterizes the Royal Navy of
the Great Wars and beyond. Its presence is visible at the level of command most
revealing of change – that of officer entry. In terms of both the selection of quarterdeck
boys and the evolutions that took place in the nature of the authority granted them, we
find the embodiment of a social ancien régime. The navy encapsulated Clark’s vision of
English society at large throughout the period of the French Revolutionary and
Napoleonic Wars. “The state form . . . associated with commercial and financial strength,
fiscal efficiency, and naval success, was not the ‘modern state’ in our sense: it was the
state form identified by William Cobbett in the 1820s as ‘Old Corruption’.”103
In the Royal Navy of the nineteenth century the quarterdeck boy reflected
changing conceptions of quarterdeck privilege. The new face of command was well-born,
well-educated, and well-connected, and might, with any luck, also exhibit a spark of
talent. The Royal Navy of the Great Wars institutionalized the maxim of command that
came to dominate popular conceptions of the age – a paradigm that demanded its boys be
both officers and gentleman.
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APPENDIX A: HONORABLE LIEUTENANTS PASSED BY YEAR,
PER STEEL’S NAVY LIST

Honorable Lieutenants Passed By Year, per Steel's Navy List.
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Source: TNA: PRO Ref. Bks. 359.3 ADB, Steel’s Navy List, Dec. 1795, 1797, 1799, 1801, 1803, 1804,
1806, 1807, Nov. 1801, Aug. 1812, Nov. 1814.
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APPENDIX B: HONORABLE QUARTERDECK BOYS OF THE
BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR, 1805
Ship/Guns/Command

No. Quarterdeck Boys
by Rating

No. "Honorable" Boys
(son of baronet or higher)

Total Q’Deck
Boys

Victory (104) - Nelson/Hardy

Mids=22, V1=9

2

31

Royal Sovereign (100) - Coll./Rotherham
Britannia (100) - Northesk/Bullen

Mids=21, V1=7

0

28

Mids=26, V1=4
Mids=18, V1=8
Mids=16, V1=6
Mids=15, V1=1
Mids=25, V1=2
Mids=12
Mids=15, V1=6
Mids=16, V1=2
Mids=17
Mids=17, V1=9
Mids=18, V1=4
Mids=13, V1=2
Mids=16, V1=9
Mids=14, V1=3
Mids=14, V1=2
Mids=14, V1=1
Mids=11, V1=5
Mids=16, V1=6
Mid=13, V1=7
Mids=16, V1=5
Mids=17, V1=7
Mids=9, V1=4
Mids=10
Mids=11, V1=6
Mids=12, V1=3
Mids=10
Mids=10, V1=4
Mids=6, V1=3
Mids=6, V1=3
?=1
?=2

0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
2
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0

30

16

587

Temeraire (98) – Harvey
Neptune (98) – Fremantle
Dreadnought (98) – Conn
Prince (98) – Grindall
Tonnant (80) – Tyler
Belleisle (74) – Hargood
Revenge (74) – Moorsom
Spartiate (74) – Laforey
Mars (74) – Duff
Definance (74) – Durham
Minotaur (74) – Mansfield
Conquerer (74) - I. Pellew
Achilles (74) – King
Colossus (74) – Morris
Defence (74) – Hope
Leviathan (74) – Bayntun
Bellerophon (74) – Cooke
Orion (74) – Codrington
Swiftsure (74) - Rutherford
Ajax (74) – Pilford
Thunderer (74) Stockham
Polyphemus (64) – Redmill
Africa (64) – Digby
Agamemnon (64) – Berry
Euryalus (36) – Blackwood
Phoebe (36) – Capel
Naiad (36) – Dundas
Sirius (36) – Prowse
Pickle (Schooner) – Lapenotiere
Entreprenante (Cutter) – Young
Total Ships = 33

26
22
16
27
12
21
18
17
26
22
15
25
17
16
15
16
22
20
21
24
13
10
17
15
10
14
9
9
1
2

Percentage of "Honorable" Boys in Trafalgar Fleet: 2.73%
Key: Mids = Midshipmen, V1 = Volunteers First Class
Source: Robert Mackenzie, The Trafalgar Roll: The Ships and Officers, intro. by Colin White (London:
Chatham Publishing, 2004)
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APPENDIX C: HONORABLE QUARTERDECK BOYS OF THE
BATTLE OF QUIBERON BAY, 1759
Ship/Guns/Command

No. Quarterdeck Boys
by Rating

No. "Honorable" Boys

Royal George (100) - Hawke/Campbell
Union (90) - Hardy/Evans

Mids=20, CS=19, AS=5
Mids=12, CS=30, AS=10

0
0

44
52

Namur (90) – Buckle

Mids=24, CS=32, AS=12

1

68

Duke (90) – Graves
Mars (74) – Young

Mids=11, CS=27
Mids=16, CS=23

0
0

38
39

Warspite (74) – Bentley

Mids=13, CS=24

0

37

Hercules (74) – Fortsecue

Mids=13, CS=20

0

33

Torbay (74) – Keppel

Mids=14, CS=10

1

24

Magnanime (74) – Howe

Mids=16, CS=29

2

45

Resolution (74) - Speke (Nov 13, 1759)

Mids=15, CS=26

0

41

Hero (74) – Edgecombe
Swiftsure (70) – Stanhope

Mids=11, CS=25
Mids=12, CS=24

0
0

36
36

Dorsetshire (70) – Dennis

Mids=16, CS=18

0

34

Burford (70) – Gambier

Mids=12, CS=20

0

32

Chichester (70) – Willet
Temple (70) – W. Shirley

Mids=15, CS=26
Mids=10, CS=17

0
0

41
27

Revenge (64) – Storr

Mids=14, CS=19

0

33

Essex (64) - O'Brien
Kingston (60) – T. Shirley

Mids=11, CS=22
Mids=10, CS=15

0
0

33
25

Intrepid (60) – Maplesden

Mids=10, CS=17

0

27

Montague (60) – Rowley

Mids=9, CS=16

0

25

Dunkirk (60) – Digby
Defiance (60) – Baird

Mids=6, CS=13
Mid=11, CS=15

2
0

19
26

Joined between Ushant and Belle Isle:
Rochester (50) – Duff

Mids=10, CS=14

0

24

(son of baronet or higher)

Total Q’Deck
Boys

Portland (50) – Arbuthnot

Mids=9, CS=16

0

25

Falkland (50) – Drake
Chatham (50) – Lockhart

Mids=8, CS=15
Mids=9, CS=11

0
0

23
20

Minerva (32) – A. Hood

Mid=5, CS=8

0

13

Vengence (28) – Burslem

Mid=5, CS=9

0

14

Coventry (28) – Digges

Mids=4, CS=8

0

12

Sapphire (32) – Stratchan

Mids=6, CS=11

0

17

Venus (36) – Harrison

Missed

6

963

Total Ships = 32
Percentage of "Honorable" Boys in
Quiberon Fleet: 0.62%

Key: Mids = Midshipmen, CS = Captain’s Servant, AS = Admiral’s Servant
Source: TNA: PRO ADM36/2255-7068, Muster Rolls for the fleet at the Battle of Quiberon Bay,
November 20, 1759.
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APPENDIX D: LIEUTENANT’S PASSING CERTIFICATES, 1759, 1805, 1814

Years at Sea Before Passing
1759
(of 196 Mids and Boys)
6 yrs
7 yrs
8yrs
9yrs
10yrs
12yrs
13yrs
15yrs

102 (52.0%)
39 (19.9%)
28 (14.3%)
16 (8.3%)
5 (2.6%)
2 (1.0%)
1 (0.5%)
1 (0.5%)

1805
(of 290 Mids and Boys)

1814
(of 291 Mids and Boys)

6yrs 206 (71%)
7yrs 44 (15%)
8yrs 19 (6.5%)
9yrs 10 (3.5%)
10yrs 10 (3.5%)
14yrs
1 (0.5%)

5.5yrs
6yrs
7yrs
5yrs
8yrs
10yrs
9yrs
4.5yrs

Age Passed for Lieutenant
1759
(of 192 Mids and Boys)

Age at Entry in RN
1805
(of 285 Mids and Boys)

Age at Entry in RN
1814
(of 284 Mids and Boys)

20yrs
25yrs
21yrs
22yrs
23yrs
24yrs
29yrs
26yrs
28yrs

14yrs
15yrs
16yrs
13yrs
12yrs
20yrs
11yrs
18yrs
21yrs

14yrs
15yrs
13yrs
16yrs
12yrs
18yrs
20yrs
17yrs
21yrs

32 (16.7%)
23 (12.0%)
22 (11.4%)
19 (9.9%)
18 (9.4%)
12 (6.3%)
12 (6.3%)
11 (5.7%)
11 (5.7%)

62 (21.8%)
42 (14.7%)
30 (10.5%)
27 (9.5%)
24 (8.4%)
24 (8.4%)
15 (5.3%)
14 (4.9%)
14 (4.9%)
Entry Rank
1805
(of 288 total)

Key
V1 = Volunteer First Class
B = Boy
Mid = Midshipman
AB = Able Seaman
Ord = Ordinary Seaman
LM = Landsman
CapSvt = Captain's Servant
Sup = Supernumerary
Sch = Scholar

102 (35.0%)
60 (20.6%)
38 (13%)
25 (8.5%)
17 (5.8%)
15 (5.1%)
11 (3.8%)
8 (2.7%)

73 (25.7%)
52 (18.3%)
49 (17.2%)
24 (8.4%)
16 (5.6%)
12 (4.2%)
12 (4.2%)
11 (3.9%)
9 (3.2%)
Entry Rank
1814
(of 290 total)

V1
107 (37.2%)
AB
60 (20.8%)
Boy
42 (14.5%)
Mid
26 (9.0%)
LM
13 (4.5%)
Ord
12 (4.2%)
CapSvt 10 (3.5%
Sch
10 (3.5%)
Sup
4 (1.4%)

V1
Boy
AB
Mid
Sup
LM
Ord
Clerk
Sch

148 (51%)
42 (14.5%)
34 (11.7%)
20 (6.9%)
16 (5.5%)
14 (4.9%)
8 (2.8%)
5 (1.7%)
2 (0.7%)

Note: 2 to 4.5yrs credit for sea time for Sch

Note: up to 2yrs credit for sea time for Sch

Source: TNA: PRO ADM107/5 for 1759, PRO ADM107/32-33 for 1805, PRO ADM107/46-47 for 1814.
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